Defendant's evidence in support of its cross motion to dismiss is insufficient to prove that plaintiffs' cause of action accrued in 1990. Rather, the documentary evidence supports plaintiff's contention that she "discover[ed] the primary condition on which the claim is based" (Matter of New York County DES Litig., 89 N.Y.2d 506, 509; CPLR 214-c) in September 1991, less than three years before the action was commenced against defendant in August 1994. To the extent that plaintiff may have exhibited some symptoms after her alleged exposure to paint fumes in 1990, these "early symptoms [were] too isolated or inconsequential to trigger the running of the Statute of Limitations under CPLR 214-c (2)" (supra, at 514, n 4). Plaintiff only missed two and a half days of work after the alleged 1990 exposure, and neither sought medical attention nor filed a workers' compensation claim until after the subsequent 1991 exposure (compare, Whitney v. Quaker Chem. Corp., 90 N.Y.2d 845). Concerning amendment of the complaint, which seeks only to add new legal theories based on the same set of facts already pleaded, defendant fails to articulate any resulting prejudice (see, Norwood v. City of New York, 203 A.D.2d 147, lv dismissed 84 N.Y.2d 849; Trusthouse Forte [Garden City] Mgt. v. Garden City Hotel, 106 A.D.2d 271). We have considered defendant-appellant's other arguments and find them to be without merit.
Concur — Milonas, J. P., Rosenberger, Nardelli, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.