Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that Stanley Kaplan, the injured plaintiff, did not suffer a "serious injury" within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). The defendants established, prima facie, that Kaplan's injuries were not serious (see, Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955).
The plaintiffs' papers submitted in opposition to the motion failed to raise a question of fact as to the issue of serious injury. The affirmation of Kaplan's examining physician was deficient in several respects and therefore insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Kaplan suffered a serious injury. In addition to the physician's failure to support her conclusions with any objective proof (see, Merisca v. Alford, 243 A.D.2d 613; Antoniou v. Duff, 204 A.D.2d 670; Barrett v. Howland, 202 A.D.2d 383), the affirmation failed to demonstrate that the accident was a proximate cause of the claimed spinal injuries (see, Khodadadian v. Wolff, 242 A.D.2d 681; Cacaccio v. Martin, 235 A.D.2d 384; Waaland v. Weiss, 228 A.D.2d 435; Lichtman-Williams v. Desmond, 202 A.D.2d 646). Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is granted.
Bracken, J. P., Copertino, Santucci, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.