Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law and as an exercise of discretion, with costs, the appellants motion is granted, the complaint is dismissed insofar as asserted against it, and the action against the remaining defendants is severed.
The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to dismiss the action based upon the plaintiffs failure to serve a complaint ( see, CPLR 3012 [b]). In order to successfully oppose the appellant's motion, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a meritorious cause of action and a reasonable excuse for the delay ( see, Culley v. Morrison, 247 A.D.2d 356; Chiaffarano v. Winston, 234 A.D.2d 329, 330; V.D.R. Realty Corp. v. New York Prop. Ins. Underwriting Assn., 186 A.D.2d 645, 646). Although "[t]he determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default `lies within the sound discretion of the trial court'" (Perellie v. Crimson's Rest., 108 A.D.2d 903, 904, quoting DeVito v. Marine Midland Bank, 100 A.D.2d 530, 531; see also, Bardales v. Blades, 191 A.D.2d 667, 668), and the court may accept law office failure as an excuse ( see, CPLR 2005), in the instant case the Supreme Court erred in accepting the explanation of the plaintiff's counsel that his delay in serving a complaint was caused by some unspecified law office failure. This Court has held that "law office failure, without supporting facts to explain and justify the default, is insufficient to establish an excusable default" ( Swedish v. Bourie, 233 A.D.2d 495, 496; see, American Sigol Corp. v. Zicherman, 166 A.D.2d 628, 629).
Bracken, J.P., Copertino, Santucci, Florio and McGinity, JJ., concur.