FRANK ALLEY, Bankruptcy Judge
BACKGROUND
The Debtor took two pianos to Ken Kadwell for restoration and repair work. On February 3, 1994, while the pianos were still in the possession of Mr. Kadwell and after Mr. Kadwell had completed at least some of the repair work, the Debtor filed bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. The pianos were not specifically listed in the schedules, nor was an exemption claimed for the pianos. When the Trustee learned of the existence of the pianos, he claimed them for the estate with a total value of $4,500. The pianos remained in the possession of Mr. Kadwell, subject to a claimed possessory lien for the value of services rendered in the amount of $2,500. The Debtor was granted a discharge of debts on May 5, 1994.
Sometime later, Kadwell sold one of the pianos to a third party for payment of his costs and fees, upon the alleged advice of attorney Jeffrey Pollack of Hillier Scheibmeir, P.S. that Washington bailor/bailee law supersedes federal bankruptcy law. The Debtor's attorney informed the Trustee of the sale by letter, but nothing was apparently done by the Trustee in response thereto. On February 14, 1998, the Trustee filed a notice of intent to abandon the estate's interest in the pianos. When no objections to abandonment were forthcoming, the estate's interest in the pianos was deemed abandoned nineteen days thereafter and the case was closed on March 13, 1998. Upon motion by the Debtor, the case was reopened on July 7, 1998 to allow the filing of this adversary proceeding and reclosed on July 8.
The complaint alleges improprieties in the foreclosure of Kadwell's alleged possessory lien, imposition of an improper possessory lien, conversion, and violation of the automatic stay. Compensatory damages of $60,000 and punitive damages are prayed for. Alternatively, the Plaintiff asks for an order allowing redemption of the pianos. The responding Defendant, Hillier and Scheibmeir, P.S., moves for dismissal on jurisdictional grounds and under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
DISCUSSION
Jurisdiction
The Defendant argues that the bankruptcy court does not have jurisdiction over this matter because the outcome of the proceeding could not conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy. This is so because the property of the estate has been abandoned and the case has been closed.
Jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1334. That section gives exclusive jurisdiction to the federal district court (and through referral to the bankruptcy court) over bankruptcy cases, and concurrent jurisdiction with other competent nonbankruptcy courts of all civil proceedings "arising under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11." The Defendant is correct that the test for determining whether a civil proceeding is "related to" a case under title 11 is to determine whether there is any conceivable effect on a bankruptcy case being administered. If this court's jurisdiction were based solely on "related to" jurisdiction, there is no doubt that jurisdiction would be lacking. However, the Plaintiff bases part of his complaint on a violation of the automatic stay and his action is brought in part under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). To that extent, it is a civil proceeding "arising under" title 11 rather than "related to" a case under title 11. This court therefore has subject matter jurisdiction over this proceeding regardless of any possible effect on the underlying bankruptcy case.
Violation of Automatic Stay 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) states that "An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages." The key to recovery is the ability to prove an injury. In the context of the alleged violation of the automatic stay of § 362, this is where the Plaintiff's case fails.
The complaint alleges that the stay violation occurred while the pianos were property of the estate. That being the case, the claim for damages under § 362(h) is likewise vested in the estate. Under 11 U.S.C. § 554(c), "any property scheduled under section 521(1) of this title not otherwise administered at the time of the closing of the case is abandoned to the debtor. . . ." Under § 554(d), "property of the estate that is not abandoned under this section and that is not administered in the case remains property of the estate." The claim for damages under § 362(h), being neither scheduled nor abandoned, remains property of the estate under § 554(d). The Debtor is therefore not the proper party to bring the action.
Moreover, the Debtor was not injured by the alleged violation of the automatic stay during the pre-abandonment period in which the pianos were property of the estate. The Debtor had no equity in the nonexempt property; any damage to estate property or recovery of the assets during this period would have accrued to the estate rather than to the Debtor. See In re Weisberger, 205 B.R. 727 (Bankr. M.D. Penn. 1997); In re Adams, 212 B.R. 703 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). Absent an injury, there can be no recovery under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h). The claim under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) must therefore be dismissed.
Avoidance of Post-petition Transfer 11 U.S.C. § 549(d) allows the trustee to avoid an unauthorized post-petition transfer of property of the estate. To the extent that the Debtor is attempting to avoid the effects of Kadwell's foreclosure of his lien on the piano under § 549, it must fail for a number of reasons. First, the provision allows a trustee to avoid the transfer, not a debtor. Second, the piano is no longer property of the estate, having been abandoned by the Trustee. Third, § 549(d)(1) states that a proceeding under that section may not be brought after two years after the date of the transfer sought to be avoided. The Debtor, while not giving the exact date that the alleged transfer took place, states in his complaint that he was informed by Kadwell in February, 1996 that one of the pianos had been sold. An action under § 549 would thus have had to occur at the latest by February, 1998. As this adversary proceeding was filed on June 15, 1998, an action under § 549 is time barred. Non-bankruptcy Causes of Action
This court derived its jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding through the 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) claim arising under the Bankruptcy Code. That basis for jurisdiction has now been eliminated. To the extent this court has any discretion to continue to adjudicate the pendant non-core state-law claims in the absence of direct jurisdictional authority, it declines to do so. Those claims must be adjudicated in another forum.
Motion to Enter Default Judgment
Defendant Kadwell failed to file an answer to the complaint and Plaintiff filed a motion to enter a default judgment. "Default Judgments may only be granted upon well pleaded facts alleged in a complaint, and only for relief for which a sufficient basis is asserted in a complaint." General Electric Capital Corp. v. Bui and Tran, 188 B.R. 274 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 484 U.S. 870 (1987)). As discussed earlier, there is no basis for relief under the Bankruptcy Code and, lacking a jurisdictional basis, this court will not consider other non-core claims. The motion to enter default judgment is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons given in this opinion, Defendant Hillier and Scheibmeir's motion to dismiss is granted. Plaintiff's motion to enter a default judgment as to Defendant Kadwell is denied. An order and judgment consistent herewith will be entered.