Order unanimously affirmed with costs. Memorandum: Supreme Court properly determined that the incontestability clause of the subject disability policy bars defendant from raising the defense that plaintiff's multiple sclerosis condition first manifested itself prior to the date on which the policy was issued ( see, New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Doe, 249 A.D.2d 285; Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 125 A.D.2d 75; White v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 96 A.D.2d 732, appeal dismissed 60 N.Y.2d 702; see also, Equitable Life Assur. Socy. v. Poe, 143 F.3d 1013 [applying Michigan law]; Estate of Doe v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 86 Haw. 262, 948 P.2d 1103; Oglesby v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 770, affd 127 F.3d 1096 [applying Delaware law]; Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146 [Del]; Equitable Life Assur. Socy. v. Bell, 27 F.3d 1274 [applying Indiana law]; insurance Commr. of Md. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 Md. App. 156, 680 A.2d 584, cert granted 344 Md. 115, 685 A.2d 450; Fischer v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 458 F. Supp. 939 [applying New York law]; Taylor v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 106 N.H. 455, 214 A.2d 109).
We reject defendant's contention that the court's interpretation of the incontestability clause of the policy will promote or encourage fraud. Insurance Law § 3216 (d) (1) (B) (i) allows an insurer to set forth in its incontestability clause an exception for "fraudulent misstatements". Defendant elected not to incorporate that clause in its policy. ( see, Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Oglesby, supra, at 1148-1149; Equitable Life Assur. Socy. v. Bell, supra, at 1279).