Ordered that the order of disposition is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the fact-finding order is vacated, and the proceeding is dismissed.
We conclude that reversal is required. The Family Court failed to ascertain whether the appellant was aware at the time of his admission of the "possible specific dispositional orders" that the court might issue in his case (Family Ct Act § 321.3). Nor was he told the exact nature of the placement contemplated by the court or its possible duration ( see, Matter of LeJuane S., 247 A.D.2d 481; Matter of Melvin A., 216 A.D.2d 227; Matter of Herbert RR., 214 A.D.2d 891). In addition, the court failed to advise the appellant of his right to a fact-finding hearing ( see, Matter of Delmar C., 207 A.D.2d 998), and failed to obtain a proper allocution from the appellant's mother, who was present in the court, in accordance with Family Court Act § 321.3 (1) ( see, Matter of LeJuane S., supra; Matter of Shantique F., 223 A.D.2d 590).
Inasmuch as the appellant has completed the period of placement, dismissal of the petition is warranted ( see, Matter of Herbert RR., 214 A.D.2d 891; Matter of Corey L., 140 A.D.2d 609).
In view of our determination, we need not reach the appellant's remaining contention.
Mangano, P. J., Joy, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.