Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The record fails to support the father's contention that the Family Court sua sponte ordered the two proceedings consolidated for trial. The court's determination was the result of an application made by the attorney for the respondent in Proceeding No. 1 and the petitioner in Proceeding No. 2, and joined by the Law Guardian. Furthermore, in light of the common issues presented by the proceedings, and the father's failure to establish prejudice to a substantial right, we agree with the Family Court that consolidation of the proceedings for trial was appropriate ( see, CPLR 602 [a]; McDutchess Bldrs. v. Dutchess Knolls, 244 A.D.2d 534). As the court noted in the order on appeal, the issue of the father's right to assigned counsel as the petitioner in Proceeding No. 1 was rendered academic upon the consolidation of that proceeding with Proceeding No. 2 in which he was the respondent and had counsel assigned to him.
The evidence at the hearing amply supports the Family Court's findings in Proceeding No. 1 that the father had not attempted to visit or contact his son for 10 years, and that the father was violent, unstable, and irresponsible. Although denial of a parent's right of visitation is a drastic remedy, under the circumstances of this case, we agree with the Family Court that forcing the son to visit the father would be detrimental to the son's welfare ( see, Jones v. Jones, 185 A.D.2d 228; Matter of Jones v. Jones, 155 A.D.2d 542; Matter of Heyer v. Heyer, 112 A.D.2d 539; Goldring v. Goldring, 73 A.D.2d 955).
Finally, we decline to disturb the award of counsel fees to Deborah Ahrem, the respondent in Proceeding No. 1.
Mangano, P. J., Rosenblatt, Ritter and Altman, JJ., concur.