MARRIAGE OF CAVEN

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Docket Number

No. 66199-5.

Attorney(S)

William A. Buchanan; and Edwards, Sieh, Smith Goodfriend, by Catherine Wright Smith, for petitioner. Anderson Fields, by H. Michael Fields, for respondent.

Judges

SMITH, J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

CarolAnn M. Caven and Daniel W. Caven were married in 1989 and had two children. In January 1995, CarolAnn filed for dissolution of the marriage. During the proceedings, the King County Superior Court found that Daniel had engaged in acts of domestic violence against CarolAnn, including property destruction and physical altercations. Despite these findings, the trial court granted both parents mutual decision-making authority over their children in the parenting plan. The parenting plan was incorporated into the dissolution decree signed in April 1996.

CarolAnn appealed the trial court’s decision to allow mutual decision-making despite the history of domestic violence. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the statute prohibited mutual decision-making upon a finding of a history of domestic violence regardless of grievous bodily harm. Daniel then petitioned the Washington Supreme Court for review, which was granted.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the phrases "a history of acts of domestic violence" and "an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm" in RCW 26.09.191(1)(c) modify each other or constitute alternatives.
Whether the trial court had discretion to grant mutual decision-making rights under a parenting plan if any of the circumstances recited in RCW 26.09.191(1)(c) were present.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner Daniel W. Caven's Arguments

The phrase "a history of acts of domestic violence" should be defined to acknowledge a "fear-based family dynamic," allowing the court discretion to grant mutual decision-making absent fear.
The trial court had discretion to grant mutual decision-making despite the history of domestic violence.
Concerned that the Court of Appeals' interpretation would incentivize false accusations of domestic violence; however, the statute requires proof of a history of acts, not mere accusations.
Relied on cases from other jurisdictions (Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri) to support his position, though the Court rejected their applicability due to differing statutory language.

Respondent CarolAnn M. Caven's Arguments

The trial court erred in granting joint decision-making after finding a history of domestic violence.
Statutory interpretation of RCW 26.09.191(1)(c) requires sole decision-making upon a finding of a history of acts of domestic violence, regardless of grievous bodily harm.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 100 Wn.2d 325 (1983); Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wn.2d 626 (1978)	Trial court has broad discretion in matters affecting children’s welfare	Supported deference to trial court’s discretion in parenting decisions, but statutory interpretation reviewed de novo
In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795 (1993)	Standard of review: abuse of discretion for parenting decisions	Confirmed review standard for trial court’s parenting plan decisions
Dioxin/Organochlorine v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 131 Wn.2d 345 (1997)	Statutory construction is a question of law reviewed de novo	Applied de novo review to statutory interpretation at issue
Erection Co. v. Department of Labor Indus., 121 Wn.2d 513 (1993); In re Estate of Little, 106 Wn.2d 269 (1986)	Words in a statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless contrary intent is shown	Applied plain meaning rule to RCW 26.09.191(1)(c)
Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Department of Soc. Health Servs., 114 Wn.2d 572 (1990); In re Eaton, 110 Wn.2d 892 (1988)	Legislative history and statutory amendments support interpretation	Confirmed that phrases in statute are alternatives, not modifiers
In re Marriage of C.M.C., 87 Wn. App. 84, 940 P.2d 669 (1997)	Statutory interpretation of RCW 26.09.191(1)(c) prohibits mutual decision-making upon history of domestic violence	Court of Appeals’ reversal of trial court was affirmed
In re Marriage of Stern, 57 Wn. App. 707 (1990); Callan v. Callan, 2 Wn. App. 446 (1970)	Interpretation of findings of fact and conclusions of law is a question of law for the court	Referenced for standard of review on trial court findings
Shockley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 17 Wn.2d 736 (1943); Lincoln Shiloh Assocs., Ltd. v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 45 Wn. App. 123 (1986)	When findings support judgment though susceptible to another construction, findings will be given meaning sustaining judgment	Applied to uphold trial court findings consistent with judgment

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the statutory language of RCW 26.09.191(1)(c), focusing on whether the two phrases "a history of acts of domestic violence" and "an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm" modify each other or stand as alternatives. The Court found the statute's language clear and unambiguous, noting the disjunctive "or" indicates alternatives rather than modifiers. The Court rejected the Petitioner’s proposed interpretation that the phrases should be read as modifiers that would allow discretion to grant mutual decision-making when fear is absent.

The Court also examined the legislative history and prior versions of the statute, which supported the interpretation that the phrases operate as alternatives. The 1987 statute similarly separated two independent circumstances with "or," and the 1989 amendment preserved this structure, replacing one phrase with another but maintaining the alternative relationship.

The Court declined to consider out-of-state cases cited by Petitioner because those states’ statutes differ materially from Washington’s. The Court further addressed Petitioner’s concern about false accusations by emphasizing that the statute requires a court finding of a history of domestic violence, not mere allegations.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the trial court erred in its interpretation and that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the trial court’s grant of mutual decision-making.

Holding and Implications

The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision.

The Court held that under RCW 26.09.191(1)(c), the phrase "a history of acts of domestic violence" and the phrase "an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm" are alternatives, not modifiers. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting mutual decision-making based on an erroneous statutory interpretation. The parenting plan granting mutual decision-making was reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation.

The decision directly affects the parties by restricting mutual decision-making when a history of domestic violence is found, regardless of grievous bodily harm or fear. The Court did not establish new precedent beyond the statutory interpretation and reaffirmed the standard of de novo review for such questions.

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In the Matter of the Marriage of CAROLANN M. CAVEN, Respondent, and DANIEL W. CAVEN, Petitioner.

SMITH, J.

Petitioner Daniel W. Caven seeks review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division I, which reversed and remanded to the King County Superior Court a ruling interpreting the phrase "a history of acts of domestic violence" in RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) as being modified by the phrase "an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm," and granting both parents mutual decision-making under a parenting plan. We granted review. We affirm.

QUESTION PRESENTED

The principal issue in this case is whether the portion of the sentence containing two phrases " a history of acts of domestic violence . . . or an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm" in RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) modify each other or constitute alternatives. A related issue is whether the trial court had discretion to determine mutual decision-making rights under a parenting plan if any of the circumstances recited in RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) were present in the case.

(Emphasis added.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent CarolAnn M. Caven and Petitioner Daniel W. Caven were married on May 13, 1989 in Seahurst, King County, Washington. On January 30, 1995, Respondent served Petitioner with a summons and petition for dissolution of marriage. Two children, ages 30 months and 6 months, were born of the marriage.

The pleadings variously refer to Respondent as "Carol Ann M. Caven" and "CarolAnn M. Caven." She indicates her name is "CarolAnn M. Caven."

Clerk's Papers at 5.

Id.

Id. at 10.

On December 20 and 21, 1995, the parties participated in mediation conducted by Lowell K. Halverson. Issues not resolved in mediation were addressed at trial before the Honorable Carol A. Schapira, King County Superior Court, during the period February 12-15, 1996. Judge Schapira in oral remarks concluded that Petitioner Daniel W. Caven had engaged in acts of domestic violence against Respondent CarolAnn M. Caven which included "property destruction or the turning over of large objects, a bookcase, a couch, putting a hand through a wall, moving the mattress, picking up a corner of the mattress and Ms. Caven tumbles [sic] onto the floor."

Id. at 7.

Id.

Id. at 62.

Despite that observation, Judge Schapira granted the parties mutual decision-making concerning their children. This was recited in the parenting plan incorporated in the decree of dissolution and signed by the court. In explaining her decision based upon her interpretation of RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c), Judge Schapira stated:

Id. at 25, 38-47 and 74.

My finding that, although there was a history of acts of domestic violence that they, as it is paired in the statute with a single act of an assault, grievous bodily harm, or fear of such harm, that, that is a modification of the history of the acts of domestic violence. That it isn't merely the history, but that it is the fear that is produced or the grievous bodily harm that the legislature is addressing but, that is the ill that is sought to be cured.

Id. at 77.

On March 28, 1996, Judge Schapira signed a decree of dissolution which incorporated the parenting plan by reference. The final order was approved on that date but actually signed on April 10, 1996.

Id. at 15-27.

Id. at 25 and 38-47.

The parenting plan approved by Judge Schapira, with significant changes by strike-outs and interlineations, stated in part:

IV DECISION MAKING

Id. at 43.

4.1 DAY TO DAY DECISIONS.

Each parent shall make decisions regarding the day-to-day care and control of each child while the children are residing with that parent. Regardless of the allocation of decision making in this parenting plan, either parent may make emergency decisions affecting the health or safety of the children.

4.2 MAJOR DECISIONS.

Id.

Major decision regarding each child shall be made as follows:

Education decisions: joint

Non-emergency health care decisions: joint

Religious upbringing: joint 4.3 RESTRICTIONS IN DECISION MAKING:

Id. at 43.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

Although there has been (a) a history of acts of domestic violence perpetrated by the father as referenced in Section VI below, and (b) conflict by both parties during the period of the separation between the parties during visitation exchanges, the purpose of RCW 26.09.187, to protect a parent who has fear of abuse or who fears of [sic] negotiating disputes about children, a protection which is not necessary in this case. . . . .

VI. OTHER PROVISIONS

Id. at 44-45.

There are the following other provisions:

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

The respondent, Daniel Caven, has engaged in acts of domestic violence, as defined in RCW 26.09.050, which occurred throughout the marriage and increased in number and intensity throughout the last two years of the marriage prior to the separation of the parties in January 1995.

The Court orders Mr. Caven to continue participate [sic] in the anger management and domestic violence treatment program, the particulars and conditions of which are outlined as follows:

. . . .

VIII. ORDER BY THE COURT

Id. at 46.

It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the parenting plan set forth above is adopted and approved as an order of this court.

On May 10, 1996, Respondent filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. The decision of the Court of Appeals is best summarized in the opening paragraph of the opinion dated July 21, 1997 (Judge Walter E. Webster writing):

[Respondent] appeal[ed] from the [trial] court's entry of a parenting plan. She argue[d] that the trial court erred in ordering joint decision-making after finding that her husband had engaged in a history of acts of domestic violence. The question presented is one of statutory interpretation: whether RCW 26.09.191 (1) prohibits mutual decision-making whenever there is a history of acts of domestic violence or only when the violence causes grievous bodily injury or fear of such injury. We hold that the statute requires sole decision-making upon a finding of a history of acts of domestic violence regardless of whether those acts caused grievous bodily harm. Accordingly, we reverse.

In re the Marriage of C.M.C., 87 Wn. App. 84, 86, 940 P.2d 669 (1997).

Petitioner then sought review by this Court, which we granted on May 5, 1998.

DISCUSSION

[ 1, 2] In matters affecting the welfare of children, such as parenting plans, the trial court has broad discretion, and its decisions are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. But issues of statutory construction are questions of law which this court reviews de novo. In applying rules of statutory construction to the unambiguous language of a statute, "[t]he court must give words in a statute their plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent is evidenced in the statute."

In re Marriage of Cabalquinto, 100 Wn.2d 325, 327, 669 P.2d 886 (1983); Schuster v. Schuster; 90 Wn.2d 626, 632, 585 P.2d 130 (1978).

In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 801, 854 P.2d 629, 632 (1993).

Dioxin/Organochlorine v. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 131 Wn.2d 345, 352, 932 P.2d 158 (1997).

Erection Co. v. Department of Labor Indus., 121 Wn.2d 513, 518, 852 P.2d 288 (1993); In re Estate of Little, 106 Wn.2d 269, 283, 721 P.2d 950 (1986).

The current version of RCW 26.09.191 (1) reads:

(1) The permanent parenting plan shall not require mutual decision-making or designation of a dispute resolution process other than court action if it is found that a parent has engaged in any of the following conduct: (a) Willful abandonment that continues for an extended period of time or substantial refusal to perform parenting functions; (b) physical, sexual, or a pattern of emotional abuse of a child; or (c) a history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010 (1) or an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm.

RCW 26.50.010 (1) and (2) reads:

(1) "Domestic Violence" means: (a) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or assault, between family or household members; (b) sexual assault of one family or household member by another; or (c) stalking as defined in RCW 9A.46.110 of one family or household member by another family or household member.

(2) "Family or household members" means spouses, former spouses, persons who have a child in common regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together at any time, adult persons related by blood or marriage, adult persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past, persons sixteen years of age or older who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past and who have or have had a dating relationship, persons sixteen years of age or older with whom a respondent sixteen years of age or older has or has had a dating relationship, and persons who have a biological or legal parent-child relationship, including stepparents and stepchildren and grandparents and grandchildren.

[ 3-6] A plain and ordinary reading of the language in RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) leads to the conclusion that the two phrases should be interpreted as alternatives to each other and not as modifiers. The words "a history of acts of domestic violence" and "an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm" are separated by the word "or" which grammatically is a coordinating particle signifying an alternative.

Reviewing legislative history, as suggested by Petitioner, is not warranted in this case because the language of RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) is clear and unambiguous. Review of changes to the statute since its enactment reinforces a conclusion that the two phrases do not modify each other. The earlier 1987 version of RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) included the words "a history of acts of domestic violence as defined in RCW 26.50.010 (1) or an act of domestic violence which rises to the level of a felony." In that 1987 version of the statute there were two independent circumstances under which the court could grant sole decision-making in a parenting plan. The two phrases, "a history of acts of domestic violence" and "an act of domestic violence which rises to the level of a felony," separated by the word "or;" did not modify each other; but were stated as alternatives.

Multicare Med. Ctr. v. Department of Soc. Health Servs., 114 Wn.2d 572, 582, 790 P.2d 124 (1990); In re Eaton, 110 Wn.2d 892, 898, 757 P.2d 961 (1988).

In 1989, the Legislature amended RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) to its present form, replacing the phrase "an act of domestic violence which rises to the level of a felony" with the phrase "an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm." In amending the statute, the Legislature continued language indicating its intent that the amended phrases, like the original phrases, operate as alternatives through use of the word "or" connecting the two.

Under its reading of RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) in this case, the Court of Appeals was correct in concluding that the discretion of the trial court in determining parental decision-making is restricted by circumstances stated in the statute.

Petitioner cites cases from Iowa, Louisiana and Missouri to support his assertion that the trial court had discretion to grant mutual decision-making under the circumstances in this case. The language of RCW 26.09.191(1)(c) is not the same as, nor even reasonably comparable to, the language of the Iowa, Louisiana and Missouri statutes underlying those decisions. Those cases therefore have no value in construing the meaning of RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c).

In re Marriage of Forbes, 570 N.W.2d 757 (Iowa 1997).

Simmons v. Simmons, 649 So.2d 799 (La.Ct.App. 1995).

Hamilton v. Hamilton, 886 S.W.2d 711 (Mo.Ct.App. 1994).

IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41.

LA.REV.STAT. ANN. § 9:364, subd. A.

MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375, subd.2 (5).

Petitioner asserts that "a history of acts of domestic violence" must be "defined in a way that acknowledges that it is . . . [a] fear-based family dynamic" where the court has discretion to grant mutual decision-making if there is absence of that fear. That is not correct. The clear and unambiguous language of RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) does not lend itself to such an interpretation.

Pet. for Review at 13; see also Supplemental Br. of Pet'r at 14.

Petitioner voices concerns that if the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the statute is adopted then "a parent wishing to restrict the other parents relationship with their child would be given an incentive to levy false accusations of domestic violence." Actually, RCW 26.09.191(1)(c) requires a finding by the court that there is "a history of acts of domestic violence." Mere accusations, without proof, are not sufficient to invoke the restrictions under the statute.

Pet. for Review at 12; see also Supplemental Br. of Pet'r at 14.

In his Supplemental Brief, Petitioner cites In re Marriage of Stern, Callan v. Callan, Shockley v. Travelers Ins. Co., and Lincoln Shiloh Assocs., Ltd. v. Mukilteo Water Dist. The first two cases stand for the "well established [rule] that the interpretation or construction of findings of fact and conclusions of law presents a question of law for the court." The third and fourth cases stand for the rule that "when the language of findings . . . support[s] the judgment, though also susceptible of another construction, the findings will be given that meaning which sustains the judgment, rather than one which would defeat it." These cases are not directly relevant to statutory construction, although the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, incorporating the parenting plan, is the critical point of reference in this case.

17 Wn.2d 736, 137 P.2d 117 (1943).

45 Wn. App. 123, 724 P.2d 1083 (1986).

In re Marriage of Stern, 57 Wn. App. 707, 712, 789 P.2d 807 (1990) (citing Callan v. Callan, 2 Wn. App. 446, 448, 468 P.2d 456 (1970)).

Shockley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 17 Wn.2d 736, 743, 137 P.2d 117 (1943); Lincoln Shiloh Assocs., Ltd. v. Mukilteo Water Dist., 45 Wn. App. 123, 131, 724 P.2d 1083 (1986).

We conclude that the Superior Court incorrectly reached its conclusions and that the Court of Appeals was correct in reversing the trial court.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The decision of the Court of Appeals, Division I, correctly reversed the trial court which incorrectly interpreted RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c), resulting in that court erroneously granting the parties mutual decision-making. The trial court usually has broad discretion in determining matters relating to the welfare of children, but in matters of statutory construction this Court exercises de novo review.

The words of an unambiguous statute must be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent is evidenced in the statute. In RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c), the phrase "an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm" does not modify the preceding phrase "a history of acts of domestic violence." The sentence containing the two phrases separates them with the disjunctive "or" which grammatically indicates that the phrases are alternatives. A review of prior amendments to RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) also supports the conclusion that the phrases were meant to be interpreted as alternatives, and not as modifiers of each other.

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, Division I, which reversed and remanded to the King County Superior Court its ruling that under RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c) the phrase "a history of acts of domestic violence" is modified by the phrase "an assault or sexual assault which causes grievous bodily harm or the fear of such harm" and its ruling granting the parties mutual decision-making based upon the trial court's erroneous interpretation of RCW 26.09.191 (1)(c).

DURHAM, C.J., and DOLLIVER, GUY, JOHNSON, MADSEN, ALEXANDER, TALMADGE, and SANDERS, JJ., concur.