TOOMEY, JUSTICE.
This pro se negligence action is before the court on the motion of defendants Leominster Police ("Police") and the City of Leominster ("Leominster") for summary judgment. Plaintiffs Michael Sadlowski, Jocelyn Sadlowski and Suzanne Sadlowski (collectively, "Sadlowskis") allege that they suffered injuries as the result of police negligence in obtaining a search warrant and in conducting a search of the Sadlowski residence. The Sadlowskis allege also that Leominster was negligent in that it did not have a "nontamperable date and time stamp for the processing of search warrants." Defendants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Sadlowskis failed to make proper presentment of their claim as required by G.L.c. 258, § 4.
BACKGROUND
In August, 1996, Leominster police detective Joseph Siciliano ("Siciliano") filed an application and an affidavit for a search warrant for the Sadlowski residence at 85 Harvard Street, Leominster, Massachusetts. The warrant was issued, and, on August 23, 1996, the warrant was executed by Siciliano and Leominster Detective Sergeant Louis Benoit ("Benoit").
The record does not reveal the date upon which the warrant was issued, but the cause of action asserted by the present complaint arises not from the issuance, but from the execution. The date of issuance is, therefore, immaterial.
On August 19, 1998 Sadlowski served Benoit with the instant complaint. On September 19, 1998, Sadlowski submitted a letter to the Mayor of Leominster, providing him with copies of the complaint sent to Benoit and seeking negotiation of a settlement of Sadlowski's claims.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kourouvacilis v. General Motors Corp., 410 Mass. 706, 716 (1991). There are no such issues in the matter at hand, and, as a matter of law, defendants are entitled to prevail.
Pursuant to the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act, no civil action may be instituted against a public employer (here, the Police and Leominster) for any injury caused by the negligence or wrongful conduct of an employee "unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such employer within two (2) years after the date upon which the cause of action arose." G.L.c. 258, § 4. Failure to make proper presentment bars a claim against a public employer for the negligence or wrongful conduct of its employees. See Richardson v. Dailey, 424 Mass. 258, 259 (1997).
In the matter at bar, although Sadlowski served his complaint on Benoit on August 19, 1998, arguably within the two year requirement, he did not notify an "executive officer" of the City. Consequently, this court must decide whether, as a matter of law, the complaint served on Benoit was sufficient to satisfy the presentment requirement of G.L.c. 258, § 4.
G.L.c. 258, § 4, specifies the officers upon whom presentment is to be made.
As a general rule, strict compliance with the presentment requirement is a condition precedent to recovery under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. Vasys v. Metropolitan District Commission, 387 Mass. 51, 55 (1982). To satisfy the presentment threshold, Massachusetts courts have required that the letter be sent to the public official who has the authority to investigate the validity of the claim, negotiate a settlement, and take steps to prevent similar claims from being brought in the future. Wightman v. Methuen, 26 Mass. App. Ct. 279, 281 (1988). That requirement is designed to ensure that there is sufficient communication to "allow the public employer to investigate the claim in full . . . and to arbitrate, compromise or settle any such claim as it sees fit." Carifio v. Watertown, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 571, 576 (1989).
Benoit was not an official possessing such authority, and, therefore, Sadlowski's effort to comply with the statutory presentment requirement was deficient. See Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 43, 45-49 (1982). The Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Court have both recognized the insufficiency of presentment in circumstances similar to those obtaining in the instant case. Where notice of a claim was sent to the pertinent governmental entity, but was not addressed to an official specifically designated by the statute, the claim failed to meet the presentment requirements. Id. See also Holahan v. Medford, 394 Mass. 186, 189 (1985) (notifying city solicitor did not satisfy presentment requirement because only town manager had authority to negotiate and/or settle the claim); Baptiste v. Sheriff of Bristol County, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 119, 126-127 (notice to County Sheriff inadequate where statute required presentment to County Commissioners). By notifying only Benoit of his alleged claim, Sadlowsky thus failed to satisfy the requirement that he notify an official with the authority to investigate the claim and negotiate a settlement.
Sadlowsky argues, however, that the presentment requirement ought to be waived by this court pursuant to the principles expressed in Moran v. Mashpee, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 681 (1984). The argument is unavailing because, in Moran, there was a factual question as to whether the town's actions led the plaintiff to believe that the town was waiving its presentment defense. In Moran, the initial notice was sent to the town clerk, who did not have the statutory authority to investigate and negotiate the claim. When Moran then filed a complaint against the town, the town's answer alleged defective presentment as an affirmative defense. After a conversation with the town's attorney, Moran's attorney sent a second notice which properly notified the board of selectmen. Moran and the town disagreed as to whether the conversation with the town's attorney had induced Moran to believe it was waiving the presentment defense. Id. at 680, 681.
Under those facts, the Appeals Court held that the defendant had raised a factual question as to whether the town was estopped from claiming improper presentment. Id. Moreover, both letters had been sent within two years of the triggering cause of action. The Appeals Court held, therefore, that waiving the presentment requirement in that case did not vitiate the statutory purpose of presentment because the necessary information had indeed been communicated to the proper public officials within two years of the incident. Id at 681, fn8. The Moran facts are not replicated at bar, and there is no good reason to indulge a Moran-like waiver in Sadlowski's favor.
Although Sadlowsky apparently expected that Benoit would forward his complaint to the Mayor — a recipient contemplated by G.L.c. 258, § 4 — the law places no burden on Benoit to do so. The Mayor first received notice of the complaint concerning the August 23, 1996 incident when he received Sadlowski's letter on September 19, 1998. The law is clear that, where the executive officer does not receive notice of the claim within two years of the alleged incident and where waiver is not appropriate, presentment is fatally flawed. Consequently, Sadlowski's claim is barred as a matter of law.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that defendants' motion for Summary Judgment is ALLOWED.
Daniel F. Toomey Justice of the Superior Court
Dated: January, 1999