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Docket Number

No. 97-3955

Advocates

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Karen E. Ehrlich, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant. Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rochelle L. Kirdy, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Judges

SHAHOOD, J.

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Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion: Anthony Oleandi v. State of Florida, No. 97-3955 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan. 6, 1999)

Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant Anthony Oleandi appealed from a Judgment and Restitution Order and from an Order denying the return of property following proceedings in the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County (L.T. No. 95-21359CF). Oleandi had been charged by information with two counts of burglary of a structure and two counts of grand theft involving antique lunch boxes, thermoses and weapons, and pled guilty. Pursuant to a search warrant at the time of arrest, police seized a large quantity of property from Oleandi's house and warehouse. The seized items were displayed by police and made available to persons who had filed police reports. Oleandi moved for return of property (excluding the items charged in the information). At the hearing the State reported that several individuals identified property they alleged Oleandi stole; the trial court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to resolve disputes outside the information and refused to take testimony from potential claimants. The Fourth District affirmed the Judgment and Restitution Order (citing Sperry v. State) but reversed the order denying return of property and directed an evidentiary hearing.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the trial court had authority/jurisdiction to hear and resolve ownership disputes and order the return of property seized from the defendant.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to take testimony from potential claimants and in denying the defendant's motion for return of property without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

Appellant moved for return of property seized by police, asserting that property not charged in the information should be returned to him.

Appellee's Arguments

The State reported that several persons identified items they alleged were stolen by appellant and one couple attended the hearing to reclaim property.
The State argued the court could not release the property because it was subject to potential criminal proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Sperry v. State, 671 So.2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)	Authority supporting the Judgment and Restitution Order affirmed by this court.	The court affirmed the Judgment and Restitution Order based on Sperry.
Kern v. State, 706 So.2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)	Recognition of a court's inherent power to direct return of property and that the State may not indefinitely retain seized items absent forfeiture or intent to prosecute.	Used to support the proposition that courts can order return of seized property and to require forfeiture proceedings or proof of intent to prosecute if the State seeks to retain items.
Brown v. State, 613 So.2d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)	Court's inherent power to assist the true owner in recovery of property held in custodia legis and extension to property seized from suspects.	Quoted to show the trial court acquires authority to resolve ownership questions once prosecution is pending.
Coon v. State, 585 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)	Continuation of the court's inherent power to direct return of property not needed as evidence after termination of the underlying criminal case.	Cited to support the inherent authority to return property when it's no longer needed as evidence.
Sawyer v. Gamble, 400 So.2d 992, 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)	If prosecution is instituted, the court in which prosecution is pending has jurisdiction over seized property used as evidence; if not held as evidence or no prosecution ensues, the court to which the warrant and property are returned has jurisdiction.	Applied to distinguish when the criminal court has jurisdiction to determine ownership versus when another court should.
Stone v. State, 630 So.2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)	Trial court has inherent power to determine whether enumerated items were seized and whether a valid basis exists to permit their return; sets criteria for remand and evidentiary hearing.	The Fourth District ordered remand for an evidentiary hearing and directed the trial court to apply the same criteria set forth in Stone.
Butler v. State, 613 So.2d 1348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)	When seized property is no longer in police possession, the claimant may need to initiate a separate civil action.	Cited within Stone's framework to instruct that lack of police possession may require a civil suit rather than a criminal-court remedy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed two distinct rulings on appeal. First, it affirmed the Judgment and Restitution Order by reference to this court's prior decision in Sperry v. State. Second, it examined the trial court's refusal to adjudicate the motion to return property.

The court reasoned that trial courts possess an inherent power to direct the return of property seized from criminal defendants or to refuse its return, citing Kern, Brown and Coon. Quoting Brown, the court observed that once a trial court assumes jurisdiction over criminal charges it is vested with power to assist true owners in recovering property held in custodia legis. The court explained the jurisdictional rule from Sawyer: when prosecution is pending and the property serves an evidentiary purpose, the criminal court acquires jurisdiction to resolve ownership questions; conversely, if the property is not held as evidence or no prosecution ensues, the court to which the warrant and property are returned has jurisdiction.

The court relied heavily on Stone v. State for both legal framework and remedial directions: Stone requires a remand and evidentiary hearing where the trial court must (1) determine whether the property was seized as alleged, (2) ascertain whether the property remains in police possession (if not, advise that a civil action may be necessary per Butler), and (3) decide whether the property was introduced in evidence, is subject to forfeiture, or whether no one else can demonstrate a superior possessory interest—if none, the property should be returned to the defendant or his designee. Kern was cited to emphasize that the State cannot indefinitely retain items without timely forfeiture proceedings or a showing of intent to prosecute.

Applying these principles, the Fourth District concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to take testimony and in declining to resolve the ownership disputes without an evidentiary hearing, and thus reversed and remanded with directions to hold such a hearing utilizing Stone's criteria.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

Direct effects on the parties:

The Judgment and Restitution Order is affirmed (per Sperry v. State).
The trial court's Order denying return of property is reversed; the case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court is instructed to apply the criteria articulated in Stone v. State (determine seizure facts, whether property remains in police possession, whether items were introduced in evidence or are subject to forfeiture, and whether any third party can demonstrate a superior possessory interest).

No broader or novel precedent is announced; the court applied and followed existing authority.

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ANTHONY OLEANDI, Appellant, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee.

SHAHOOD, J.

Appellant appeals from a Judgment and Restitution Order and from an Order denying the return of property. We affirm the Judgment and Restitution Order based on this court's opinion inSperry v. State, 671 So.2d 856 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). However, we reverse the Order denying the return of property directing the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing in accordance with this opinion.

Appellant was charged by information with two counts of burglary of a structure and two counts of grand theft of antique lunch boxes, thermoses and weapons. Appellant pled guilty to the charges. At the time of appellant's arrest, the police, pursuant to a search warrant, searched appellant's property for the stolen items set forth in the information. A great deal of property was seized from appellant's house and warehouse and the "stolen goods" were displayed by the police and opened to the public for those persons who had previously filed police reports.

Appellant filed a motion to return property alleging that the property confiscated by the police should be returned, with the exception of those items charged in the information. At the hearing on appellant's motion, appellee claimed that several persons came forward and identified property that appellant had allegedly stolen. One couple even attended the hearing in the hopes of reclaiming their property. Appellee maintained that the court could not release the property to the appellant since it was all subject to potential criminal proceedings. The trial court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to settle disputes outside of that contained in the information and would only do so upon agreement by the parties. Further, the court would not take testimony from any potential claimants asserting ownership to property on the grounds that it was without jurisdiction to do so. We disagree.

A court has the inherent power to direct the return of property seized from a criminal defendant and the right to refuse to return it. See Kern v. State, 706 So.2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Brown v. State, 613 So.2d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (a separate suit for replevin or conversion is not necessary); Coon v. State, 585 So.2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (court's inherent power to direct return of property seized from criminal defendant if that property is no longer needed as evidence continues to exist after underlying criminal case has terminated).

"When a trial court has assumed jurisdiction over criminal charges, it is thereafter vested with an inherent power to assist the true owner in the recovery of property held in custodia legis." Brown v. State, 613 So.2d at 570. This power has been extended to situations where property has been seized from a criminal suspect. See id. Once a criminal prosecution is instituted, the court in which that prosecution is pending acquires jurisdiction over that property to hear and determine all questions concerning its ownership if the property seized has an evidentiary purpose. See Sawyer v. Gamble, 400 So.2d 992, 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). However, if the property seized is not held as evidence or no criminal prosecution ensues, then the court to which the warrant and property are returned obtains jurisdiction to order its return. See id.

In Stone v. State, 630 So.2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), the defendant, who had been prosecuted on felony charges, demanded the return of items seized by the police but were not used as evidence against him. The court denied the motion. In reversing, the Second District held that the trial court has the inherent power to resolve such question as whether enumerated items were, in fact, seized, and whether a valid basis exists to permit their return by authorities. 630 So.2d at 660. "It is one thing if a claimant can be located with a superior possessory interest in the property, and quite another for the property to be withheld merely on speculation that [the defendant] may have acquired it illegally." Id. Accordingly, the court reversed with the following instructions:

[W]e remand this matter for an evidentiary hearing. As a threshold matter the circuit court should determine whether the property in question was seized in the manner alleged in Stone's motion, that is, whether it was confiscated by police in connection with a prosecution that has since terminated. If Stone's facts are simply untrue, the motion may be summarily denied.

Assuming Stone has correctly stated the facts, the court should then ascertain whether the property is still in police possession. If not, it will be necessary for Stone to initiate a separate civil action. See Butler v. State, 613 So.2d 1348 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). If the property is available for return, Stone is nevertheless not entitled to it if (contrary to the motion) the property was introduced in evidence or if the state intends, and is able, to pursue forfeiture against the property. If, however, the state was unable to connect the items to specific criminal activity, and no one else can be identified who can demonstrate a superior possessory interest in the property, it should be returned to Stone or to such person(s) as he may designate.

Id. at 660-661. Likewise, in Kern, 706 So.2d at 1369, the Fifth District held that the state would not be permitted to indefinitely retain items seized from the defendant's flea market booth, following his acquittal on the charge of delivering drug paraphernalia and the trial court's order releasing items to the state. The state would be required, if it wished to retain the items, to timely filed forfeiture proceedings or make a showing that it intended in good faith to bring another criminal prosecution for which the items would be admissible. See id.

In accordance with Stone, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing with directions for the trial court to utilize the same criteria set forth above.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.

KLEIN and GROSS, JJ., concur.

OLEANDI v. STATE