A review of the reasonable doubt charge, as a whole, demonstrates that it contained no burden-shifting language ( see, People v. Thomas, 50 N.Y.2d 467) and did not impose an affirmative obligation on the jury to articulate a basis for such doubt ( see, People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 251-252). We find no error in the court's refusal to charge, as requested, that reasonable doubt could be found, not only from the evidence in the case, but also from the lack of evidence ( People v. Radcliffe, 232 N.Y. 249, 254; see also, People v. Nazario, 147 Misc.2d 934). The charge as a whole, including the court's instructions on the jury's evaluation of a one-witness case, adequately conveyed the requested concept.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Nardelli, Rubin and Mazzarelli, JJ.