IN RE PETITION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF JUDICIAL HIGHWAY

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Docket Number

No. 33,255.

Attorney(S)

Russell L. Frazee, for relator. E.A. Rogstad and Streissguth Gislason, for respondents.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a judicial proceeding under Minn. St. 1941, § 162.20, initiated by a petition to establish a judicial highway between Sibley and Renville counties. The petition described the proposed road's route along the county line but did not specify the width of the road. Commissioners appointed by the district court made a report recommending establishment of the road, which the court confirmed. The case comes before the Supreme Court of Minnesota on certiorari to review the district court's confirmation of the commissioners' report.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the width of a road must be specifically determined and stated in a judicial proceeding to establish a road under Minn. St. 1941, § 162.20.
Whether failure to state the width of the proposed road invalidates the commissioners' report and the court's order confirming the report.
Whether the minimum width fixed by Minn. St. 1941, § 160.02 applies to roads established by judicial proceedings under § 162.20.
Whether the necessity of the road, as found by the commissioners and confirmed by the court, can be presumed absent conclusive evidence to the contrary.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
In re Feeney, 20 Misc. 272, 45 N.Y. S. 830	The court's function in confirming or rejecting commissioners' reports and the necessity of specifying road width in laying out a road.	Used to support that the court cannot modify or add to the commissioners' report and that failure to state width renders the report and confirmation order invalid.
Small v. Eason, 33 N.C. 94, 97	"Lay out" a road means to designate its width and dimensions, not merely its route.	Quoted to emphasize that laying out a road includes fixing its width, which must be stated in the commissioners' report.
In re King, 42 Misc. 480, 87 N.Y. S. 236, 237	Requirement that the road's width be specified in judicial road proceedings.	Supported the conclusion that omission of width renders the road establishment ineffective.
Sonnek v. Town of Minnesota Lake, 50 Minn. 558, 52 N.W. 961	Establishing a public highway requires a definite and certain description of location and dimensions.	Used to underline the necessity of clearly defining the road's boundaries to avoid future disputes.
State v. Hendrickson, 80 Minn. 352, 83 N.W. 153	Importance of certainty in defining public highways over private property.	Reinforced the principle that a highway must have definite boundaries.
Mahoney v. Kelley, 156 Minn. 327, 194 N.W. 775	Presumption that commissioners' decision on road necessity is correct unless conclusively rebutted.	Applied to affirm the lower court's finding of necessity absent conclusive contrary evidence.
Hill v. Board of Supervisors, 95 Cal. 239, 30 P. 385	Failure to state road width does not invalidate the petition in road establishment proceedings.	Supported that preliminary steps such as petition and appointment of commissioners remain valid despite omission of width.
Watson v. Crowsore, 93 Ind. 220	Same as Hill v. Board of Supervisors regarding validity of petition despite omission.	Same application as above.
Boston Providence R. Corp. v. Town Council of Lincoln, 13 R.I. 705	Failure to state width does not invalidate order appointing commissioners.	Used to support that appointment of commissioners stands despite omission.
Clarke v. Town Council of South Kingstown, 18 R.I. 283, 27 A. 336	Same as Boston Providence R. Corp.	Same application as above.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying the principal issue: whether the width of a road must be specifically determined and stated in judicial road establishment proceedings under Minn. St. 1941, § 162.20. The court observed that the petition, order, commissioners' report, surveyor's report, and confirmation order all failed to specify the road's width.

The court noted that the establishment of highways is primarily a legislative function, typically exercised by county and town boards for local roads. The statute § 162.20 provides a judicial procedure for roads crossing multiple counties, delegating the power to appoint commissioners to lay out the road. The commissioners have powers analogous to those boards, including determining the road's route, need, and dimensions. The court's role is limited to confirming or rejecting the commissioners' report without modification.

Drawing on precedent, the court emphasized that "laying out" a road necessarily includes designating its width as well as its route. A road without a specified width is legally meaningless. Therefore, the commissioners must fix and report the width, and failure to do so renders both their report and the court's confirmation order invalid and ineffective.

The court rejected the argument that the minimum width prescribed by Minn. St. 1941, § 160.02 (four rods) automatically applies in judicial road proceedings, noting that this statute governs roads established by town and county boards, not judicial commissioners. The court also rejected attempts to infer the width from damage awards and road length, finding such calculations too uncertain and impractical for public notice.

Despite invalidating the confirmation order, the court held that the failure to state the width did not invalidate the petition or the order appointing commissioners, which are preliminary procedural steps. The court directed that on remand, the commissioners should determine and fix the road's width and submit a new report accordingly.

Regarding the road's necessity, the court found the commissioners' and lower court's findings sufficient. It reaffirmed the principle that the necessity of establishing the road is presumed unless conclusively disproved, which was not done here. Thus, the necessity determination stands, and future proceedings should focus on the width and any changed conditions since the last hearing.

The court also addressed a procedural objection about the surveyor's plat not being filed before the hearing, finding no prejudice and leaving the issue open for the new hearing.

Holding and Implications

The court vacated the order confirming the commissioners' report insofar as it failed to specify the width of the road, and remanded the case for further proceedings directing the commissioners to determine and fix the road's width and submit a new report.

The direct effect is that the establishment of the judicial highway is not finalized until the width is fixed and confirmed in a valid proceeding. The necessity of the road remains affirmed, and the case will proceed on remand limited to the issue of width and any relevant changed conditions. No new precedent beyond the application of existing principles regarding the necessity of definite road dimensions was set by this decision.

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IN RE PETITION FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF JUDICIAL HIGHWAY BETWEEN SIBLEY AND RENVILLE COUNTIES. Reported in 6 N.W.2d 626.

Highway — establishment — province of legislature.

1. The establishing of highways is primarily a legislative function, exercised with respect to local roads by county and town boards, and in cases within Minn. St. 1941, § 162.20 (Mason St. 1927, § 2581), by commissioners appointed by the district court.

Same — same — judicial road — function of court.

2. In a judicial proceeding to establish a road under § 162.20, the function of the court is limited to one of confirmation or rejection of the commissioners' report.

Same — same — "laying out" road — necessity of designating width.

3. To "lay out" a road means to designate its width as well as other dimensions.

Same — same — judicial road — necessity of designating width — proceedings.

4. The failure of the commissioners appointed in a judicial proceeding to establish a road to state the width of the proposed road rendered their report and the order confirming the same invalid and ineffective. Minn. St. 1941, § 160.02 (Mason St. 1927, § 2544), fixing the minimum width of roads at four rods, does not apply to roads established by a judicial proceeding. The fact that the width intended by the commissioners could be ascertained by involved and uncertain calculation was not sufficient.

Same — same — same — petition and order appointing commissioners — validity.

5. The petition and the order appointing commissioners in a judicial proceeding for establishing a road were not rendered invalid by failure to state the width of the proposed road.

Same — same — same — report of commissioners — hearing on confirmation — need for road.

6. Where commissioners appointed in a judicial proceeding to establish a road report their decision that the proposed road was needed and desirable, such need will be assumed on the hearing to confirm the report, in the absence of a conclusive showing to the contrary.

Certiorari upon the relation of the county of Renville to review the decision of the district court for Sibley county, Joseph J. Moriarty, Judge, confirming a commissioners' report for the establishment of a judicial road between Sibley and Renville counties. Remanded with directions.

PIRSIG, JUSTICE.

The principal question requiring consideration is whether in the establishment of a road by judicial proceedings under Minn. St. 1941, § 162.20 (Mason St. 1927, § 2581), the width of the road must be specifically determined and set forth. In the proceedings taken below, and which are now before us on writ of certiorari, this was not done. The petition for the establishment of the road described the proposed road as beginning at a designated point and then continuing south on the Sibley and Renville county line between stated sections and terminating in the center of a public highway. This description was followed throughout the proceedings, including the order made on the hearing of the petition, the report of the commissioners appointed by the court, the surveyor's report, and the order of confirmation. Nowhere was the width of the road stated.

Section 162.20 does not definitely prescribe how and by whom the dimensions of the road are to be fixed. However, the nature of the proceedings makes it evident that they are to be determined by the commissioners appointed by the court. The establishing of highways has always been treated as primarily a legislative function. With respect to local roads, statutes, including ours, usually transfer the power to act in these matters to the county and town boards. This could not practically be done in the cases specified in § 162.20, because the roads established thereunder affect more than one county. It was therefore necessary to provide some other procedure for their creation. The section does this by placing the proceedings under the supervision of the district court. Upon a proper petition and notice, a judge of the court is authorized to name commissioners "to lay out" the road. The commissioners so appointed have substantially the same powers and functions as do county and town boards with respect to establishing roads under their jurisdiction. The only difference is that the commissioners are appointed by the court, and their action is subject to confirmation by it. After the commissioners have performed their duties they make a report on what they have done, and a hearing is held thereon. Upon this hearing, the court "may consider the propriety of establishing * * * such road and confirm or reject such report."

From this it is evident that the various decisions with respect to the road, such as its route, its need, and its dimensions, including its width, are to be made primarily by the commissioners. The function of the court is limited to the judicial one of approval or disapproval. It cannot modify the report nor add to it; nor may it direct that a road of different dimensions or one following a different route should be established. See In re Feeney, 20 Misc. 272, 45 N.Y. S. 830.

One of the duties imposed upon the commissioners is to "lay out" the road. This includes fixing its width. In speaking of a statute authorizing a jury to "lay out the road," the court in Small v. Eason, 33 N.C. 94, 97, said: "The terms, 'lay out the road' and 'lay off the road,' import that the jury should not only fix the course of the road, as passing particular points, but also designate it, after the manner of a survey, by its lines: in other words, lay down the whole ground covered by the road, or specify its width." A road without width is meaningless. This dimension is as necessary as its length. The commissioners must therefore establish the width of the road, and this must be stated in their report to the court. Omitting to do so results in establishing no road at all, and any order confirming such a report is equally ineffective. In re Feeney, 20 Misc. 272, 45 N.Y. S. 830; In re King, 42 Misc. 480, 87 N.Y. S. 236, 237.

Reasons of policy dictate that this rule should be insisted upon. It is important that the limits of the rights of the public and of private persons affected by the road should be clearly defined and ascertainable. This will avoid controversy and litigation in the future. It is as important here as in any other transaction involving the transfer or acquisition of real estate. Such has been the trend of the decisions in this state. In Sonnek v. Town of Minnesota Lake, 50 Minn. 558, 560, 52 N.W. 961, this court said: "It is as plainly impossible to establish a public highway over private property by an order which in no manner defines or makes certain the location of it, as it is to give legal effect to a deed of conveyance which embraces no certain description of any land as the premises conveyed." See also State v. Hendrickson, 80 Minn. 352, 83 N.W. 153.

It is said that in the absence of any description of the width of the road, the minimum width of four rods fixed by § 160.02 controls, and that this eliminates any uncertainty or indefiniteness which might otherwise exist on this question. That section applies to roads "established by town and county boards." It does not in express terms include commissioners appointed by the court, and we cannot say that they are included by implication when we consider the variety of duties imposed on county and town boards generally which obviously are not intended to be imposed on such commissioners.

It is also claimed that by taking the total acreage for which damages were allowed to private owners of land adjoining the road and the length of the road which is specified we can calculate that a road of four rods' width was intended. But the calculation becomes involved and uncertain when we are compelled to deduct, as have the respondents, for intersections and railroad rights of way. Neither should we expect the public and those affected by the road to possess or acquire the mathematical ingenuity displayed in urging the point before they can discover the width of the road.

The order of confirmation, therefore, cannot be sustained. However, the entire proceedings are not invalid. The failure to state the width of the road did not invalidate the petition, see Hill v. Board of Supervisors, 95 Cal. 239, 30 P. 385; Watson v. Crowsore, 93 Ind. 220; nor did this affect the order appointing the commissioners. Boston Providence R. Corp. v. Town Council of Lincoln, 13 R.I. 705; Clarke v. Town Council of South Kingstown, 18 R.I. 283, 27 A. 336. These are but steps preliminary to the creation of the agency empowered to deal with the question. When this case returns to the lower court, it is sufficient that it direct the commissioners to determine and fix the width of the road and to submit a new report accordingly.

Much evidence was produced as to the need for the road. Relator contends that this evidence was insufficient to sustain the findings of the lower court that the road was needed. The testimony covers such matters as the cost of the road, the people benefited by it, its value to the public, etc. Some of the witnesses testified to facts showing the road was needed. Others testified to the contrary. The view the lower court took confirms that of the commissioners specifically designated to consider that along with other questions. It should be noted that the lower court was not presented with an original question but rather with a confirmation or rejection of the conclusions of the commissioners on a question essentially legislative and not judicial in character. The rule is well settled that the correctness of their decision as to the necessity and propriety of establishing the road is assumed, and "this presumption can be overcome only by showing conclusively that no necessity for it existed." Mahoney v. Kelley, 156 Minn. 327, 331, 194 N.W. 775, 776, and cases there cited. Such a showing was clearly not made in this case.

The necessity for the road having thus been established, it will not be necessary for the court to reconsider the entire issue again. When the commissioners have made their new report in accordance with the views herein expressed and a new hearing is had, the necessity and propriety of the road should be reconsidered only insofar as the determination of the width of the road and changed conditions occurring since the last hearing might affect the question. In all other respects the former decision of the court on this question stands.

Objection is made that the surveyor's plat of the road was not filed before the hearing. No harm to anyone is claimed. It was filed shortly thereafter, and since a new hearing is to be had the question requires no further consideration. Should it appear that any claims or contentions were omitted at the former hearing because the plat had not been filed, they can be made at the new hearing. Should the new report of the commissioners call for alterations in the plat, it is assumed they will be made and the altered plat filed before the hearing, in accordance with the statute.

The order confirming the commissioners' report, insofar as it is inconsistent herewith, is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

MR. JUSTICE STREISSGUTH took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.