Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Where, as here, conflicting expert testimony is presented, the question of whether or not the defendant suffered from mental disease or defect at the time of the commission of the crime is for the jury, which has the right to accept or reject the opinion of any expert ( see, People v. Bergamini, 223 A.D.2d 548, 549; People v. Yong Ho Han, 200 A.D.2d 780). Absent a serious flaw in the testimony of the People's expert, the jury's finding of sanity will not be disturbed ( see, People v. Bergamini, supra; People v. Yong Ho Han, supra). The jury clearly accepted the testimony of the People's expert that the defendant, despite his mental illness, knew and appreciated the consequences of his actions at the time of the crime and that his actions were wrong. As we discern no serious flaw in the testimony of the People's expert, the jury's finding of sanity will not be disturbed ( see, People v. Bergamini, supra; People v. Robertson, 123 A.D.2d 795; see also, People v. Wood, 12 N.Y.2d 69).
By interposing an "insanity defense", the defendant necessarily put in issue relevant aspects of his character and personal history, and required the People, on rebuttal, to prove him sane beyond a reasonable doubt ( see, People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241, 248-249). The court therefore properly ruled that evidence of the defendant's conviction arising from his shooting of his father in 1973 was admissible to show that his motive for the shooting in the case at bar was revenge and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any, potential prejudice ( see, People v. Santarelli, supra; see generally, People v. Alvino, 71 N.Y.2d 233).
The defendant's sentence, was not excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 83).
Bracken, J. P., O'Brien, Sullivan and Goldstein, JJ., concur.