Ordered that the order of disposition entered December 22, 1997, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the Family Court's finding that he violated the terms of his second conditional discharge was supported by a preponderance of the evidence ( see, Family Ct Act § 360.3; see also, Matter of Julies R., 250 A.D.2d 855; Matter of Amanda RR., 230 A.D.2d 451; Matter of Alpheaus M., 168 A.D.2d 208; Matter of Gregory M., 131 Misc.2d 942).
The Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in placing the appellant with the Office of Family and Children Services for a period of 18 months. The Family Court has wide discretion in entering dispositional orders ( see, Family Ct Act § 141; Matter of Shariyf W., 245 A.D.2d 383). Moreover, it is well settled that "[t]he least restrictive alternative test does not require the court to actually try the lowest form of intervention, have it fail, and then try each succeeding level of intervention before ordering * * * placement" ( Matter of Anthony M., 142 A.D.2d 731, 732; see, Matter of Lloyd L., 246 A.D.2d 651; Matter of Jason W., 207 A.D.2d 495; Matter of Jamil W., 184 A.D.2d 513). The Family Court's decision demonstrated that it carefully considered less restrictive alternatives to placement and balanced the needs of the appellant and the need for the protection of the community ( see, Family Ct Act § 352.2 Fam. Ct. Act [2]).
The appellant's remaining contention is without merit.
Bracken, J. P., Sullivan, Altman and Friedmann, JJ., concur.