Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's equivocal silence while being questioned by detectives did not constitute an invocation of her right to remain silent ( see, People v. Cohen, 226 A.D.2d 903, revd on other grounds, 90 N.Y.2d 632; People v. Aponte, 180 A.D.2d 910; People v. Acquaah, 167 A.D.2d 313; People v. Madison, 135 A.D.2d 655, affd 73 N.Y.2d 810). While the defendant's period of silence had been preceded by custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings, the defendant had made only an exculpatory statement about the forgery charges during this improper questioning. Therefore, there is no danger that her subsequent confession to the murders was made on constraint of some prior statement ( see, People v. Chapple, 38 N.Y.2d 112; People v. Abreu, 184 A.D.2d 707).
The trial court's general charge on the voluntariness of the defendant's confession, taken from 1 CJI(NY) 11.01, at 656-661, adequately conveyed the proper standards to the jury. The court was not required to give the additional instructions requested by the defendant.
O'Brien, J. P., Ritter, Thompson and Goldstein, JJ., concur.