Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
The plaintiff sought leave to amend her bill of particulars to further allege that the defendants had been negligent in "placing a stitch in [her] sigmoid colon during a surgical procedure" and that as a result of the defendants' malpractice she sustained "severe emotional problems manifesting themselves in depressive symptomatology and suicide ideation".
It is well settled that leave to amend or supplement pleadings should be freely granted unless the amendment sought is palpably improper or insufficient as a matter of law, or unless prejudice and surprise directly result from the delay in seeking the amendment ( see, McCaskey, Davies Assocs. v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 59 N.Y.2d 755; East Patchogue Contr. Co. v. Majesty Sec. Corp., 181 A.D.2d 714; Nissenbaum v. Ferazzoli, 171 A.D.2d 654). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in permitting the plaintiff to amend her bill of particulars to allege negligent placement of the stitch. The medical information which serves as the basis for that allegation has been freely available to the defendants since the time of discovery, and there can be no real claim of prejudice or surprise ( see, Drechsel v. Loblaw, Inc., 64 A.D.2d 1022). Furthermore, the plaintiff was properly permitted to amend her bill of particulars to allege more specifically the precise nature of her claimed emotional pain, suffering, and distress ( see, Scheuerman v. Health Hosps. Corp., 243 A.D.2d 553; Fick v. LaGuardia Med. Group, 208 A.D.2d 800).
Miller, J. P., Sullivan, Friedmann and Luciano, JJ., concur.