The IAS Court correctly determined that plaintiff was not licensed either at the time of the activities that purportedly generated the right to a commission or at the time the lease transaction was consummated and that plaintiff was, accordingly, barred, pursuant to Real Property Law § 442-d, from commencing the instant action to recover a commission for having brokered the lease transaction ( see, Galbreath-Ruffin Corp. v. 40th 3rd Corp., 19 N.Y.2d 354, 362-363). The fact that plaintiff company's president, Sharon Saltin-Shahar, was a licensed broker at the time of the transaction does not save the cause of action on behalf of the corporation ( see, Hudson Michael Realty v. Oliner, 184 A.D.2d 929; Philip Mehler Realty v. Kayser, 176 A.D.2d 104, lv dismissed 79 N.Y.2d 977; Rogovin v. Bach Realty, 147 A.D.2d 364). Nor was the court's denial of plaintiff's cross motion to amend the complaint to substitute Ms. Satlin-Shahar as plaintiff in error. While amendment of a pleading should ordinarily be freely granted (CPLR 3025 [b], it may be denied where the proposed amended cause is plainly lacking in merit ( see Daniels v. Empire-Orr, Inc., 151 A.D.2d 370). Here, the proposed amendment would not have rendered the cause for a commission viable, for although Ms. Satlin-Shahar was plaintiff's president and, at least purportedly, its alter ego, the record clearly demonstrates that she was not the procuring cause of the lease.
Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Rubin, Mazzarelli and Saxe, JJ.