Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
This mortgage foreclosure action was commenced in 1992. In their answer, the appellants asserted as an affirmative defense the lack of personal jurisdiction based on improper service of the summons and complaint. On or about December 10, 1997, the appellants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them, based on that affirmative defense. The Supreme Court properly concluded that the appellants waived the defense of improper service by failing to move to dismiss on that ground within 60 days of January 1, 1997, the effective date of the 1996 amendment to CPLR 3211 (e) ( see, Wade v. Byung Yang Kim, 250 A.D.2d 323; Fleet Bank v. Riese, 247 A.D.2d 276). Consequently, we do not reach the issue of whether service was properly effected.
The appellants' objections to a second service of the summons and complaint attempted by the plaintiff are academic, and their remaining contentions are without merit.
Bracken, J. P., Sullivan, Altman and Friedmann, JJ., concur.