Ordered that the judgment is modified, on the law, by vacating the sentences imposed on the convictions of robbery in the first degree and burglary in the first degree; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for resentencing in accordance herewith.
Where, as here, a defendant moves to dismiss an indictment on the grounds specified in CPL 30.30 and makes a prima facie showing that the People exceeded the six-month trial readiness deadline, the burden falls on the People to demonstrate that the delay greater than six months should be excluded ( see, People v. Santos, 68 N.Y.2d 859, 861; People v. Kendzia, 64 N.Y.2d 331, 337). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People's papers were sufficient to justify denying the motion without a hearing inasmuch as they have shown that the chargeable time did not exceed six months.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant was sentenced to concurrent indeterminate terms of 12 1/2 to 25 years imprisonment for the convictions of robbery in the first degree and burglary in the second degree. This was improper. Pursuant to Penal Law § 70.04 (2), when the court has found, as in this case, that a defendant is a second violent felony offender, the court must impose a determinate sentence of imprisonment which shall be in whole or half years. As a result, the matter must be remitted for resentencing on the robbery and burglary convictions in accordance with Penal Law § 70.04 (2).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
Ritter, J. P., Sullivan, Altman and McGinity, JJ., concur.