Any error in the admission of certain portions of the statements received as declarations against penal interest was harmless ( People v. Ayala, 75 N.Y.2d 422, 43 1-432; see also, People v. Maher, 89 N.Y.2d 456, 462-463), since this evidence did not serve to undermine defendant's defense.
The statements made by the victim at the hospital were properly received as excited utterances, since there was ample evidence to "justify the conclusion that the remarks were not made under the impetus of studied reflection" ( People v. Edwards, 47 N.Y.2d 493, 497).
The court properly instructed the jury on the standards to be utilized in determining the voluntariness of defendant's precinct statements. Readministration of the Miranda warnings after a 6-hour interval was unnecessary, since "defendant knowingly and intelligently waived those rights [initially] and had remained in continuous custody, in a non-coercive environment, during [the interval]" ( People v. Shomo, 235 A.D.2d 208, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 988). Accordingly, there was no reason to submit this issue to the jury as part of the voluntariness charge.
The court's charge conveyed the appropriate principles regarding the affirmative defense to felony murder. Given the facts of the case, the court sufficiently addressed the concept of reasonableness of a belief under Penal Law § 125.25 (3).
Concur — Ellerin, P. J., Nardelli, Wallach and Rubin, JJ.