Ordered that the order is' reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint is granted, and the third-party complaint is dismissed.
The third-party defendant established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In opposition, the third-party plaintiff failed to demonstrate a right to common-law indemnification from the appellant. The predicate for common-law indemnity is vicarious liability without fault on the part of the proposed indemnity, and it follows that a party who has itself participated to some degree in the wrongdoing cannot receive the benefit of the doctrine ( see, Henderson v. Waldbaums, 149 A.D.2d 461; County of Westchester v. Becket Assocs., 102 A.D.2d 34, affd 66 N.Y.2d 642). Since the third-party plaintiff actually participated to some degree in the alleged wrongdoing, he cannot claim indemnification. Furthermore, any claim by the third-party plaintiff for contribution from the appellant is barred by General Obligations Law § 15-108 (b) since the plaintiffs gave the appellant a general release. Thus, the appellant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint.
Mangano, P. J., Santucci, Krausman and Florio, JJ., concur.