Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is granted, and the complaint is dismissed.
The Supreme Court erred in denying the appellants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against them. The appellants are immune from liability for the conduct underlying the plaintiffs' causes of action. The appellants' acts were not exclusively ministerial, but involved the exercise of discretion and judgment ( see, Mon v. City of New York, 78 N.Y.2d 309; Tango v. Tulevech, 61 N.Y.2d 34).
In any event, the plaintiffs' cause of action to recover damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress must be dismissed inasmuch as the appellants' conduct did not unreasonably endanger the safety of the plaintiff Lauren Davies, or cause her to fear for her safety ( see, Losquadro v. Winthrop Univ. Hosp., 216 A.D.2d 533; Glendora v. Gallicano, 206 A.D.2d 456). There is also no merit to the plaintiffs' cause of action alleging a violation of Public Health Law § 2305 (1).
Ritter, J. P., Altman, Goldstein and McGinity, JJ., concur.