Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the plaintiff from producing expert medical testimony based on her failure to comply with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) ( see, Lyall v. City of New York, 228 A.D.2d 566; Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 199 A.D.2d 257; Corning v. Carlin, 178 A.D.2d 576). The plaintiff did not respond to disclosure demands until after the trial began, and failed to include the substance of the expert testimony sought to be precluded by the defendant ( see, Rassaei v. Kessler, 252 A.D.2d 577). Additionally, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause for her noncompliance with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) ( see, Kaprelian v. Kaprelian, 236 A.D.2d 369).
O'Brien, J. P., Thompson, Krausman and Luciano, JJ., concur.