JOHN W. SEDWICK, District Judge.
At docket 296, plaintiff Sherrie Ace ("Ace") files a Notice of Acceptance of Remittitur and Brief Supporting Proposed Judgment. Defendant Aetna Life Insurance Co. ("Aetna") files a response at docket 299. Oral argument has not been requested and would not assist the court.
II. DISCUSSION
The issue presented by the current motion is whether post-judgment interest should run from the date the court originally entered judgment, July 3, 1996, or from the date judgment is entered on remand. The general rule is that post-judgment interest runs from the date judgment is entered on remand when an appellate court reverses judgment for one party and orders a money judgment for the other party. However, the Ninth Circuit recognizes an equitable exception to the general rule:
Post-judgment interest is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
James B. Lansing Sound, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 801 F.2d 1560, 1571 (9th Cir. 1986).
[I]f a plaintiff wins a jury verdict, the trial court enters a judgment n.o.v. for defendant, and the appellate court reverses and remands with instructions to enter judgment on the original verdict, then postjudgment interest runs from the entry of the original judgment, not from entry of the new judgment on remand.
Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg. S.A., 842 F.2d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702 F.2d 752, 754-57 (9th Cir. 1983)).
This equitable exception was first applied in the Ninth Circuit in Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., where the court held that post-judgment interest should run from the date of the original judgment after a judgment n.o.v. was reversed on appeal. The court reasoned "[i]t would be anomalous to read section 1961 so narrowly that the cost of delay in payment is imposed on a successful plaintiff." Other cases have reached comparable results. For example, in Northrop Corp. v. Triad Int'l Mktg., S.A., an arbitrator entered an award in Triad's favor. The district court vacated the award. Triad appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed and reinstated the arbitration award. On further review, the Ninth Circuit held that post-judgment interest ran from the date the district court vacated the arbitration award, and not from the date when judgment was entered on remand.
702 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 757.
842 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 1156-57.
Here, this court entered judgment as a matter of law and not a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but this distinction is not material. This case falls squarely within the confines of the equitable exception applied in the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, Aetna acknowledges that when a judgment n.o.v. is reversed on appeal, post-judgment interest should run from the date of the original judgment.
See Aetna's Response, docket 299 at 8-9 (citing and discussing authorities).
Aetna argues that post-judgment interest only begins to run when damages have been ascertained. Because the punitive damage award was not definitely ascertained until now, Aetna contends that post-judgment interest should run from the date a judgment is entered after remittitur, and not from the date of the original judgment. However, Aetna's argument introduces an element of absolute certainty which finds no support in controlling Ninth Circuit precedent. In Tinsley v. Sea-Land Corp., the Ninth Circuit held post-judgment interest ran from the date of original judgment even though damages were reduced as a result of an appeal. In Tinsley, the court held that the district court erred in not considering a plaintiff's comparative negligence when calculating damages. On remand, the district court considered the plaintiff's comparative negligence and reduced the plaintiff's damages. The district court ordered post-judgment interest on the new damages award to run from the date of the original judgment. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that damages were sufficiently ascertained from the date of the original judgment even though the damages were subsequently reduced. Tinsley demonstrates that "meaningful ascertainment" does not mean "absolute ascertainment." Both parties cite a Third Circuit case, Dunn v. Hovic, where the court held post-judgment interest ran from the date of the original judgment even though punitive damages were remitted from over $26 million to $1.5 million. This court agrees with Ace that Dunn is persuasive support for her position.
See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835-36, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1576 (1990).
979 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1383-84.
13 F.3d 58, 61 (3d Cir. 1993).
Aetna also argues that the equitable exception should only govern compensatory damages. Aetna contends that the policy concerns which protect the time-value of a plaintiff's damage award are simply not existent where, as here, a punitive damage award is substantially reduced from $16.5 million to $950,000. From Aetna's perspective, Ace "has no legitimate complaint about being deprived of the time value of her non-compensatory punitive windfall during the time the award was being reviewed for excessiveness." However, the policy concerns animating Aetna's argument would disallow post-judgment interest for all punitive damage awards. Moreover, application of the rule advocated by Aetna would reward the wrongdoer. In light of Turner and its progeny, it seems clear that the proper result commands application of the equitable exception recognized in the Ninth Circuit.
Aetna's Response, docket 299 at 12.
Id.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Ace's motion at docket 296 is GRANTED. Post-judgment interest shall run from the date of the original judgment.