The "substantial evidence" standard for establishing a parking violation set forth in respondent's hearing procedures manual does not violate due process ( Matter of Silverstein v. Appeals Bd. of Parking Violations Bur., 100 A.D.2d 778, lv denied 62 N.Y.2d 606). The due process implications of making the traffic enforcement agent's availability for cross-examination subject to the Hearing Officer's discretion is obviated by the availability of CPLR article 78 relief ( see, Jaouad v. City of New York, 4 F. Supp.2d 311, 314). In this case, for example, the one ticket not found to be fraudulent was invalidated by the IAS Court on the ground that the Hearing Officer's refusal to bring in the issuing officer was arbitrary and capricious. Indeed, with respect to the constitutional issues, it is dubious whether petitioner is an aggrieved party with standing to appeal, since the administrative procedures of which he complains served to secure for him restitution of all fines, penalties and expenses that resulted from three of the tickets in issue, and, as noted, judicial recourse secured restitution for the fourth. Petitioner's money claim for the damage caused to his car when it was towed was properly rejected absent evidence that such damage was caused by respondent's employees, and his money claim for the time spent challenging the tickets is not cognizable as a matter of law ( cf., All Aire Conditioning v. City of New York, 979 F. Supp. 1010, 1015-1016, affd 166 F.3d 1199). Petitioner presented no bona fide civil rights claim that would warrant an award of attorneys' fees and costs ( see, Matter of Middleton v. Perales, 160 A.D.2d 800, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 714, cert denied 502 U.S. 858), and the denial of statutory costs was a proper exercise of discretion.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Rosenberger, Tom, Saxe and Buckley, JJ.