DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs to the respondents appearing separately and filing separate briefs.
Contrary to the plaintiff's contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that he was an "at-will" employee. Absent an agreement establishing a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time for any reason or no reason by either party ( see, Rooney v. Tyson, 91 N.Y.2d 685, 689; Matter of De Petris v. Union Settlement Assn., 86 N.Y.2d 406, 410). Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot maintain causes of action to recover damages for breach of an employment agreement and wrongful termination.
The Supreme Court properly dismissed the cause of action sounding in defamation. The complaint failed to comply with the special pleading requirement that the particular defamatory words be set forth therein, thereby mandating dismissal ( see, CPLR 3016[a]; Monsanto v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 141 A.D.2d 514). In any event, the statements that the plaintiff alleges were defamatory were contained in documents created by the defendants and forwarded by them to the Insurance Department of the State of New York, and were protected by absolute privilege ( see, Julien J. Studley, Inc. v. Lefrak, 50 A.D.2d 162, 164, affd 41 N.Y.2d 881; see also, Insurance Law § 2112[d]).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.