DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
It is well settled that a criminal defendant has a right to be present, inter alia, at all material stages of trial at which evidence is introduced ( see, People v. Monroe, 90 N.Y.2d 982; People v. Williams, 85 N.Y.2d 945). Thus, to the extent that the appellant, as opposed to any of his six codefendants, was the focus of the pretrial proceedings to determine the admissibility of evidence at trial, he had a right to be present ( cf., People v. Jackson, 219 A.D.2d 675; People v. Morris, 187 A.D.2d 460). However, it is also settled that the right to be present may be waived ( see, People v. Spotford, 85 N.Y.2d 593; People v. Belton, 254 A.D.2d 297 [2d Dept., Oct. 5, 1998]; People v. Stokes, 216 A.D.2d 337). Under the facts of the instant case, we conclude that the appellant's right to be present during all portions of the pretrial suppression proceedings were waived. This was a complicated trial that initially involved seven defendants who allegedly participated in a fatal gang-related attack. The court, with the acquiescence of all seven defense attorneys, structured the proceedings so that only the defendants who were the subject of each witnesses' identification testimony would be present in court during that testimony. While on several occasions there was passing mention of the appellant during testimony that was given in his absence, no proceedings material to the appellant's case were in fact conducted in his absence ( see, People v. Jackson, supra; People v. Morris, supra). On the whole we are satisfied that the appellant's rights were adequately protected, and that he received a fair trial.
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.