DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In order to be liable for common-law negligence, it must be shown that the defendant owed the plaintiff some duty ( Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 782). The courts of this State have held that a school or learning facility does not stand in the position of in loco parentis to adult students attending classes ( see, Eiseman v. State of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 190; Talbot v. New York Inst. of Technology, 225 A.D.2d 611, 612-613; Wells v. Bard Coll., 184 A.D.2d 304). This derives from the notion that adult students are capable of caring for themselves and making independent decisions ( Mintz v. State of New York, 47 A.D.2d 570, 571). In the present case, however, the record demonstrates that the program in which the adult plaintiff was enrolled was a rehabilitation program which provided simple vocational training to its students. Moreover, the plaintiff and the majority of the other students were mentally deficient and incapable of caring for themselves and making independent decisions. Thus, the defendants stood in loco parentis to the plaintiff ( see, Mirand v. City of New York, 84 N.Y.2d 44, 49; Schrader v. Board of Educ. of Taconic Hills Cent. School Dist., 249 A.D.2d 741; cf., Ellis v. Mildred Elley School, 245 A.D.2d 994, 995). Accordingly, the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff to "adequately supervise" her and are "liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate supervision" ( Mirand v. City of New York, supra, at 49; see, Schrader v. Board of Educ. of Taconic Hills Cent. School Dist., supra).
The Supreme Court properly determined that there exist questions of fact regarding whether the defendants possessed notice of the potential danger to the plaintiff due to the fact that the plaintiff's father expressed his concerns regarding the assailant and his daughter to the defendants' employee one week before the incident, whether the assailant's acts were foreseeable, and whether any breach by the defendants was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries ( see, Bell v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 90 N.Y.2d 944; Parvi v. City of Kingston, 41 N.Y.2d 553, 560; Schrader v. Board of Educ. of Taconic Hills Cent. School Dist., supra; Ruchalski v. Schenectady County Community Coll., 239 A.D.2d 687, 688; Shante D. v. City of New York, 190 A.D.2d 356, affd 83 N.Y.2d 948). Therefore, the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment.