DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the record in this case does not demonstrate that a Batson violation occurred during jury selection ( see, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79; People v. Childress, 81 N.Y.2d 263). It is incumbent upon the party mounting a Batson challenge to "articulate and develop all of the grounds supporting the claim, both factual and legal, during the colloquy in which the objection is raised and discussed" ( People v. Childress, supra, at 268). Here, defense counsel failed to satisfy her obligation to articulate on the record a sound factual basis for her Batson claim, as she only noted the bare fact that the prosecution exercised five peremptory challenges against black venirepersons. In the absence of a record demonstrating other facts or circumstances supporting a prima facie case, the trial court correctly found that the defendant failed to establish a pattern of purposeful exclusion sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination ( see, People v. Bolling, 79 N.Y.2d 317, 325; People v. Morla, 245 A.D.2d 468; People v. Lowe, 234 A.D.2d 564; People v. Vidal, 212 A.D.2d 553).
Furthermore, the prosecution did not exhaust all of its peremptory challenges, and three black venirepersons remained on the jury ( see, People v. Harper, 124 A.D.2d 593). Accordingly, the burden of overcoming the inference of purposeful discrimination never shifted to the People ( see, People v. Durant, 250 A.D.2d 698). The fact that the trial court permitted the People, upon the prosecutor's request, to offer facially-neutral reasons supporting the peremptory challenges does not render academic the issue of whether the defendant carried his initial burden to make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were motivated by an intent to invidiously discriminate against black persons ( see, People v. Durant, supra; People v. Ocasio, 253 A.D.2d 720).