DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The hearing court concluded that the defendant's statements were voluntarily given after he had been fully apprised of his Miranda rights and agreed to waive them. This agreement was not the result of physically-coercive conditions. Much weight must be accorded a suppression court's findings of fact because of its advantages of having seen and heard the witnesses ( see, People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759). The hearing court did not err in failing to suppress the defendant's statements ( see, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436; People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72; People v. Rodriguez, 167 A.D.2d 562).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see, CPL 470.15).
The defendant was provided with meaningful representation ( see, People v. Benn, 68 N.Y.2d 941; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137; People v. McGuire, 205 A.D.2d 805).
The defendant's sentence was not illegal ( see, Penal Law § 70.25; People v. Laureano, 87 N.Y.2d 640; People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 361; see, e.g., People v. Moe, 227 A.D.2d 253; People v. Feingold, 125 A.D.2d 587) or excessive ( see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review, without merit, or do not require reversal.