We agree with the motion court that the lack of evidence that plaintiff employee fell or was struck directly by a falling object is not fatal to his Labor Law § 240 Lab.(1) cause of action, since the facts, as asserted by plaintiffs, suggest that the injuries were caused by a defective safety "device, `[that] proved inadequate to shield the injured worker from harm directly flowing from the application of the force of gravity to an object'" ( Dominguez v. Lafayett-Boynton Hous. Corp., 240 A.D.2d 310, 312, quoting Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 501; see, e.g., Skow v. Jones, Lang Wooton Corp., 240 A.D.2d 194). We disagree with the motion court, however, as to its dismissal of plaintiffs' Labor Law § 241 Lab.(6) claim. Based on evidence that a hand-cranked hoist, although expected to lock automatically with a click, did not do so, a triable issue of fact is raised as to whether the Industrial Code provision is sufficiently specific that its breach may serve as a ground for imposing liability pursuant to Labor Law § 241 Lab.(6) (see, Mattison v. Wilmot, 228 A.D.2d 991, 992, lv dismissed 89 N.Y.2d 917; cf., Narrow v. Crane-Hogan Structural Sys., 202 A.D.2d 841, 842). Moreover, unlike the situation here, in Brown v. New York City Economic Dev. Corp. ( 234 A.D.2d 33, 34), which the motion courtfelt constrained to follow, the plaintiff's injury was unrelated to the hoisting device in use at the time.
Concur — Sullivan, J.P., Tom, Lerner and Andrias, JJ.