ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly concluded that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a cause of action alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. The words attributed to the defendants were not "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community" ( Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303 quoting Restatement [Second] of Torts § 46, subd[1], comment d, see, Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 121; Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557; Ferrandino v. Bart Sons, 247 A.D.2d 428; see also, Krawtchuk v. Banco Do Brasil, 183 A.D.2d 484; Misek-Falkoff v. Keller, 153 A.D.2d 841; Dinio v. Olivar, 265 A.D.2d 371 [decided herewith]).
The Court also properly dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action sounding in prima facie tort ( see, Curiano v. Suozzi, 63 N.Y.2d 113, 118; Burns Jackson Miller Summit Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314; Belsky v. Lowenthal, 47 N.Y.2d 820; see also, Gelmin v. Quicke, 224 A.D.2d 481; Lincoln First Bank of Rochester v. Siegel, 60 A.D.2d 270, 280; Zausner v. Fotochrome, 18 A.D.2d 649).
JOY, J.P., FRIEDMANN, SCHMIDT, and SMITH, JJ., concur.