ORDERED that the appeal from so much of the order as directed a specific visitation schedule for the summer of 1998 is dismissed as academic; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as reviewed; and it is further
ORDERED that the plaintiff is awarded one bill of costs.
The defendant contends that the court erred when it set forth guidelines for future summer visitation if the parties fail to agree on a visitation schedule. We disagree. It was within the court's discretion to amend its prior judgment to set forth guidelines for such visitation, and the amendment did not affect a substantial right of either party (see, CPLR 5019[a]; Kiker v. Nassau County, 85 N.Y.2d 879, 881; Stannard v. Hubbell, 123 N.Y. 520, 527; Herpe v. Herpe, 225 N.Y. 323, 327; Shroid Constr. v. Dattoma, 250 A.D.2d 590, 593; Irving Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 265 App. Div. 696, 698; see, e.g., Ungar v. Ensign Bank, 196 A.D.2d 204, 208; see also, Barakakos v. Avellini, 185 A.D.2d 805).
Although public policy generally mandates free access to the courts (see, Sassower v. Signorelli, 99 A.D.2d 358, 359; Matter of Shreve v. Shreve, 229 A.D.2d 1005), the court's direction that future applications would not be accepted without prior consultation with the court was appropriate under these circumstances (see, Sassower v. Signorelli, supra, at 359; Braten v. Finkelstein, 235 A.D.2d 513, 514; Matter of Shreve v. Shreve, supra; Duffy v. Holt-Harris, 260 A.D.2d 595 [2d Dept., Apr. 26, 1999]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
BRACKEN, J.P., FRIEDMANN, GOLDSTEIN, and McGINITY, JJ., concur.