BEVERLY v. ANDERSON

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Docket Number

C031293

Attorney(S)

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Pamela Smith-Steward, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charlton G. Holland III, Assistant Attorney General, Frank S. Furtek and Michael V. Hammang, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Appellant. Northern California Lawyers for Civil Justice, Stephen Goldberg, Bess M. Brewer, Coalition of California Welfare Rights Organizations and Grace Galligher, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Judges

SIMS, Acting P.J.

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Quilla Beverly, a recipient of public assistance under the Greater Avenues for Independence Program (GAIN), filed an affidavit on December 23, 1996, asserting that her warrant for child care expenses from August to November 1996, totaling $1,339.52, had been lost, destroyed, or stolen. Sacramento County denied her claim on December 31, 1996, concluding she had received and cashed the original warrant. Beverly requested an administrative hearing, which was held on February 18, 1997, before a DSS administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ upheld the County’s denial, resolving factual disputes in the County's favor and adopting DSS’s interpretation that if evidence shows the warrant was received, it is not "lost" and need not be replaced.

On October 15, 1997, Beverly filed a petition for a peremptory writ of mandate in superior court seeking a declaration that DSS has a mandatory duty to issue replacement warrants within five working days after an affidavit is filed and an order directing DSS to replace her lost warrant. The trial court granted Beverly’s petition, ordering DSS to issue replacement warrants within five working days of receiving such affidavits regardless of any investigation, and to set aside its prior administrative decision, awarding Beverly a replacement warrant with interest. DSS appealed only the declaration portion of the order imposing a mandatory duty on DSS to issue replacement warrants to all similarly situated recipients.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Government Code section 29853.5 imposes a mandatory, ministerial duty on the California Department of Social Services (DSS) to issue replacement public assistance warrants within five working days after receiving an affidavit attesting to the loss, theft, or destruction of the original warrant, without regard to any investigation.
Whether DSS may lawfully refuse to issue a replacement warrant based on an investigation that rebuts the claimant’s affidavit within the five working day period.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant and Appellant (DSS) Arguments

DSS contends that filing an affidavit creates only a rebuttable presumption that the warrant was lost, stolen, or destroyed.
DSS argues it has the right to investigate the affidavit’s truthfulness within five working days and may refuse to issue a replacement warrant if the investigation rebuts the presumption.
The department asserts this interpretation aligns with legislative intent to allow investigation and verification before issuing replacement warrants.
DSS claims the Legislature would not intend for counties to ignore compelling contradictory evidence when issuing replacement warrants.

Plaintiff and Respondent (Beverly) Arguments

Beverly argues that section 29853.5 mandates the issuance of replacement warrants within five working days after filing an appropriate affidavit, regardless of any investigation.
She contends the statute imposes a clear, ministerial duty on DSS to replace warrants promptly to ensure recipients’ needs are met without interruption.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 863	Prerequisites for traditional mandamus require a clear, present, ministerial duty and a beneficial right to its performance.	Used to establish that DSS had a ministerial duty to issue replacement warrants and Beverly had a right to that performance.
Calderon v. Anderson (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 607, 612	On undisputed facts involving statutory interpretation, appellate courts are not bound by trial court’s determination.	Supported the appellate court’s independent review of the statutory interpretation issue.
Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871	Legislative intent is determined primarily from the statute’s plain and unambiguous language.	Guided the court to apply the plain meaning of section 29853.5 without judicial construction.
Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1047	When statutory language is clear, courts must apply it as written without adding interpretation.	Reinforced that the mandatory language “shall” imposed a duty on DSS.
Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443	“Shall” in statutes is generally construed as mandatory.	Supported the court’s conclusion that DSS’s duty to replace warrants is mandatory.
Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 607	Rejection of a provision in a statute’s legislative history indicates intent not to include that provision.	Used to interpret legislative history showing deletion of investigation provision from the bill.
California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 845-846	Omission of a provision from the final statute is strong evidence it was not intended to be included.	Supported the conclusion that investigation provisions removed from the bill were not part of the enacted statute.
Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 621, 634	Legislative omission of a provision from the final statute evidences intent not to incorporate it.	Further supported the court’s interpretation of legislative intent against investigation discretion.
California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 341	Statutes must be construed to avoid absurd results.	Supported the court’s conclusion that mandatory issuance, even if sometimes mistaken, was not absurd given public policy.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the plain language of Government Code section 29853.5, which mandates that counties "shall" replace lost, stolen, or destroyed public assistance warrants within five working days after the claimant files an affidavit attesting to the loss. The court found no language in the statute granting counties discretion to investigate or delay issuance of replacement warrants pending verification.

The court rejected DSS's interpretation that the affidavit creates only a rebuttable presumption allowing investigation and refusal to replace the warrant if the presumption is rebutted. Instead, the court emphasized that "shall" imposes a mandatory, ministerial duty.

Legislative history reinforced this conclusion: an earlier version of the bill had included provisions allowing investigation before replacement warrants were issued, but these provisions were removed before enactment. This deletion signaled legislative intent to impose a strict, non-discretionary duty on counties.

The court reasoned that requiring prompt replacement without delay aligns with the statute’s declared public policy to ensure that the needs of families receiving public assistance are met without interruption. Delays or refusals based on investigations within the five-day period would frustrate this policy and potentially cause injustice to recipients.

The court acknowledged that although this approach might occasionally result in mistaken or fraudulent claims being honored initially, DSS has sufficient statutory remedies to recover funds or pursue fraud after issuance, including recoupment, civil actions, and criminal prosecution. These remedies sufficiently protect the public fisc and deter fraud without undermining the statute’s immediate relief purpose.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that DSS has a mandatory duty to issue replacement warrants within five working days of receiving a proper affidavit, regardless of any investigation conducted during that period.

Holding and Implications

The Court AFFIRMED the trial court’s judgment granting Beverly’s petition for writ of mandate.

The court held that under Government Code section 29853.5, DSS has a mandatory, ministerial duty to issue replacement public assistance warrants within five working days after the claimant files an affidavit attesting to the warrant’s loss, theft, or destruction. This duty is not subject to delay or denial based on investigations conducted within that time frame.

The direct effect of this decision is that DSS and county welfare departments must comply strictly with the five-day replacement requirement upon receipt of a proper affidavit, ensuring prompt provision of benefits to recipients. The court did not establish new precedent on broader administrative discretion but clarified the statute’s mandatory nature and reinforced the primacy of the recipient’s right to timely benefits.

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QUILLA BEVERLY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ELOISE ANDERSON, as Director, etc., Defendant and Appellant.

SIMS, Acting P.J.

In Government Code section 29853.5 (hereafter § 29853.5), the Legislature has provided in plain terms that counties responsible for issuing public assistance warrants must replace any warrant within five working days after receiving an affidavit from the legal owner or custodian of the warrant attesting that it has been lost, stolen, destroyed, or lost in the mail. Defendant California Department of Social Services (DSS) maintains, however, that under section 29853.5 it is required only to investigate a claimant's affidavit within five working days and that it may lawfully refuse to issue a replacement warrant if not satisfied that the affidavit is truthful. The trial court disagreed and granted plaintiff Quilla Beverly's petition for writ of mandate. We shall affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Beverly, a recipient of public assistance under the Greater Avenues for Independence Program (GAIN), filed an affidavit in Sacramento County on December 23, 1996, attesting that her warrant for child care expenses for the period August-November 1996 related to her participation in GAIN, in the amount of $1,339.52, had been lost, destroyed, or stolen. On December 31, 1996, the County notified Beverly that it had denied her claim for replacement of the warrant because its investigation had led it to conclude she received and cashed the original warrant. She immediately requested an administrative hearing. The hearing took place February 18, 1997, before an administrative law judge (ALJ) for DSS.

In a decision filed July 2, 1997, the ALJ affirmed the County's action and denied Beverly's claim on both factual and legal grounds. The ALJ first resolved the factual dispute in the County's favor. As to the law, the ALJ acknowledged Beverly's contention that section 29853.5 mandates the issuance of a replacement warrant within five working days after the filing of an appropriate affidavit. However, the ALJ also noted DSS's interpretation of the statute — that if DSS obtains evidence showing that the claimant received the warrant, the warrant is not "lost" and need not be replaced — and apparently adopted that interpretation as legally correct.

On October 15, 1997, Beverly filed a timely petition for peremptory writ of mandate in the superior court under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1094.5. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, Beverly sought a declaration that DSS has a mandatory duty to issue replacement warrants within five working days after the filing of an affidavit pursuant to section 29853.5; under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, she sought an order directing the replacement of the lost warrant.

After opposition and hearing, the trial court granted Beverly's petition for peremptory writ of mandate. The court ordered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 that DSS issue replacement warrants for all public assistance warrants reported lost, stolen, or destroyed within five working days after the recipient has filed an affidavit attesting to the loss of the original warrant "regardless of any investigation undertaken during those five days" and further ordered DSS to inform all county welfare departments of the writ. The court also ordered pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 that DSS set aside its administrative decision in this matter and issue a replacement warrant to Beverly, with interest on the "wrongfully withheld funds" running from five working days after she filed her affidavit.

The transcript of the hearing has not been provided to this court.

Internal DSS documents in evidence before the trial court indicated that DSS acted in this case according to a previously adopted agency-wide policy.

On appeal, DSS does not challenge the court's order to issue a replacement warrant to Beverly under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, conceding that the facts in the matter were "disputed." DSS appeals only from that part of the trial court's order made under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, declaring that section 29853.5 imposes a mandatory duty on DSS to issue replacement warrants to all persons similarly situated to Beverly.

DISCUSSION I

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 (traditional mandamus), the trial court may issue a writ of mandate "to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station . . . ." The prerequisites for traditional mandamus are a "clear, present and usually ministerial duty upon the part of the [agency]" and a "clear, present and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty." ( Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 859, 863.) On review, where the facts are undisputed and the only issue is the proper interpretation of a statute, we are not bound by the trial court's determination. ( Calderon v. Anderson (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 607, 612.)

Section 29853.5 provides in part:

"(a) To the extent permitted by federal law and notwithstanding Article 3 (commencing with Section 29850) of Chapter 5 of Division 3 of Title 3 of the Government Code, a public assistance warrant, which has been lost, stolen, destroyed, or lost in the mail, shall be replaced by the county. Prior to replacing the warrant the legal owner or custodian shall comply with either paragraph (1) or paragraph (2), whichever is applicable:

"(1) Wait five working days . . . from the date that the warrant was mailed in cases where the warrant has been lost in the mail. After the waiting period the warrant shall be deemed to be lost and the legal owner or custodian shall be entitled to file an affidavit of the loss in the mail with the county. The affidavit shall contain information relative to the loss of the warrant in the mail, including the number, date, amount, and name of the payee of the warrant. The county shall assist the legal owner or custodian of the warrant in completing the affidavit.

"(2) If the warrant was not lost in the mail, an affidavit may be filed immediately with the county. The affidavit shall contain information relative to the loss, theft, or destruction of the warrant, including the number, date, amount, and the name of the payee of the warrant. The county shall assist the legal owner or the custodian of the warrant in the completion of the affidavit.

" (b) When the affidavit has been signed by the legal owner or custodian of the warrant, the county shall issue a replacement warrant as soon as possible to ensure that the needs of the family continue to be met, but no later than five working days from the date that the affidavit has been signed and filed with the county. . . ." (Italics added.)

DSS contends that the trial court erred by finding that section 29853.5, subdivision (b), imposed a ministerial duty on it to replace Beverly's warrant within five working days after she filed her affidavit. According to DSS, the filing of such an affidavit merely "gives rise to a rebuttable presumption" that the warrant has actually been lost, stolen or destroyed. DSS is therefore entitled to investigate the truthfulness of the warrant's averrals within five working days, and if it discovers evidence rebutting the "presumption" it may properly refuse to issue a replacement warrant. This construction of the statute, DSS asserts, is consistent with the Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute: "Surely, it is ridiculous to surmise that the Legislature intended county welfare departments to ignore compelling contradictory evidence when reason exists to investigate the circumstances of a lost warrant. And if it cannot be seriously entertained that the Legislature intended to permit issuance of replacement warrants without verification at any time, it is not reasonable to conclude that it intended section 29853.5 [to] bar the county to act on superior evidence during the five-day period triggered by the submission of a lost warrant affidavit." (Original italics.) DSS is mistaken.

First, the statute on its face cannot reasonably be construed as DSS construes it.

"`To determine legislative intent, a court begins with the words of the statute, because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.' ( Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871 [ 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 824, 891 P.2d 804].) If it is clear and unambiguous our inquiry ends. There is no need for judicial construction and a court may not indulge in it. ( In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979) 25 Cal.3d 339, 348 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 350, 599 P.2d 656].) `If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.' ( People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 947 P.2d 808].)" ( Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1047.)

Section 29853.5 plainly says that a county shall replace a warrant within five working days after the required affidavit has been filed and just as plainly says nothing about the county's duty or power to investigate before doing so. Shall is normally construed as a mandatory term in statutes. ( Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 443.) DSS has given no reason why we should construe it otherwise.

Moreover, the relevant legislative history of section 29853.5 shows that the Legislature did not intend to give DSS the discretion it purports to find therein. As we shall explain, the bill which proposed the adoption of the statute at one time contained the provision DSS now reads into it, but this provision was deleted before the bill passed. "The rejection by the Legislature of a specific provision contained in an act as originally introduced is most persuasive to the conclusion that the act should not be construed to include the omitted provision." ( Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 607; accord California Mfrs. Assn. v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 836, 845-846.) Similarly, "[t]he fact that the Legislature chose to omit a provision from the final version of a statute which was included in an earlier version constitutes strong evidence that the act as adopted should not be construed to incorporate the original provision." ( Central Delta Water Agency v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 621, 634.)

The proposed legislation (Assem. Bill No. 2243 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) § 2) was amended after its introduction to provide for the investigation of claims of lost or stolen warrants before replacement warrants were issued. (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2243 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) July 7, 1993.) However, the Senate removed that provision before sending the bill back to the Assembly. (Sen. Amend. to Assem. Bill No. 2243 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) August 16, 1993; see also Sen. Rules Com., 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2243 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.); Sen. Rules Com., Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2243 (1993-1994 Reg. Sess.) as amended August 16, 1993.) As we have seen, section 29853.5 as enacted contains nothing corresponding to the deleted provision. Therefore we conclude that the Legislature intended no such provision to be judicially grafted onto the statute. ( California Mfrs. Assn., supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp. 845-846; Central Delta Water Agency, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 634; Rich, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d at p. 607.)

The relevant language added by amendment on July 7, 1993, stated (italics added): "Notwithstanding Sections 17091 and 17092 of the Government Code, the department, with the concurrence of the Controller, shall issue regulations pertaining to the investigation of lost or stolen warrants under this section or Section 11006.6 and the issuance of replacement warrants. . . ." The amendment of August 16, 1993, deleted the italicized language and replaced it with the expression "provide for the replacement" of lost or stolen warrants.

Finally, requiring counties to carry out their ministerial duty under section 29853.5, even though this might occasionally cause replacement warrants to issue based on mistaken or fraudulent affidavits, does not give rise to an absurd result unintended by the Legislature. (See California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 341 [courts must construe statutes so as to avoid absurd consequences].) It does not do so for two reasons: the public policy underlying the statute is to ensure that the needs of public assistance recipients are met without interruption, and DSS has ample remedies available in cases of mistake or fraud.

The Legislature has declared the public policy rationale for section 29853.5 on the face of the statute: "When the affidavit has been signed by the legal owner or custodian of the warrant, the county shall issue a replacement warrant as soon as possible to ensure that the needs of the family continue to be met. . . ." (§ 29853.5, subd. (b), italics added.) To delay issuing a replacement warrant pending investigation, or to deny the warrant as a result of the investigation, would frustrate this express public policy.

Moreover, delay or refusal may well work an injustice on the statute's intended beneficiaries. Investigations do not always reach the correct result, particularly when done within such a short time frame as "five working days from the date that the affidavit has been signed and filed with the county. . . ." (§ 29853.5, subd. (b).) Here, in its brief DSS admits: "By virtue of having abandoned that portion of the judgment directed toward respondent's individual relief, appellant concedes that there may have been facts subject to dispute concerning respondent's entitlement to a relief replacement warrant." Thus, DSS admits that despite the findings of its investigation and the ALJ's determination in its favor at the administrative hearing, Beverly's affidavit could have been truthful after all. If so, it would follow that DSS's mistake forced her to go through many months of litigation to obtain the replacement warrant in September 1998, that she was entitled to as of January 1997.

If DSS investigates after issuing a timely replacement warrant and correctly determines that the recipient's affidavit was mistaken or fraudulent, it has numerous remedies under the applicable statutes. It can recoup any overpayment of benefits, whether due to mistake or fraud. (Welf. Inst. Code, § 11004, subd. (c).) Where it believes fraud occurred, it can also file an action for welfare fraud to recoup as restitution any sums paid in reliance on the recipient's fraud. (Welf. Inst. Code, § 11483) Finally, in the appropriate case, it can recommend criminal prosecution. (Welf. Inst. Code, § 10980) These remedies are sufficient to protect the public fisc and to deter potential wrongdoers. So far as they impose an administrative burden on DSS, the Legislature has determined that that burden does not outweigh the need to ensure that public assistance recipients are not deprived of their legally mandated benefits.

For all the above reasons, we conclude that the statute means what it says. The trial court properly found that DSS has a mandatory duty under the statute to issue a replacement warrant within five working days after the claimant files a proper affidavit attesting to the loss of the original warrant, regardless of any investigation DSS might choose to do during that period.

DISPOSITION

The judgment (order granting petition for writ of mandate) is affirmed. Beverly shall receive her costs on appeal.

We concur:

DAVIS, J. NICHOLSON, J.