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GARY L. WILKERSON, Defendant Below-Appellant v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below-Appellee.

MAURICE A. HARTNETT, III, Justice

O R D E R

This 2nd day of December 1999, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that:

(1) The defendant-appellant, Gary L. Wilkerson ("Wilkerson"), filed this appeal from an order of the Superior Court denying his motion to vacate sentence pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a) ("Rule 35(a)"). We find no merit to the appeal. Accordingly, we affirm.

(2) In this appeal, Wilkerson claims the Superior Court improperly sentenced him in violation of the terms of his plea agreement. He contends his sentence should be vacated because: first, the State did not honor its promise to assure his transfer to an out-of-state correctional facility for treatment as a sex offender; second, his counsel improperly relied on the promise of the State without doing an independent investigation into whether he could be transferred to an out-of-state facility; and, third, the Superior Court acknowledges it has no authority to order his transfer to an out-of-state facility.

(3) Wilkerson was charged with one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree, one count of Unlawful Sexual Penetration in the Third Degree and two counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact in the Second Degree. He pleaded guilty to one count of Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the Second Degree. The remaining charges were nolle prossed. Wilkerson was sentenced to 20 years in prison at Level V, with credit for time served, to be suspended after serving 10 years at Level V, to be followed by 2 years at Level III, then 2 years at Level II.

(4) Following entry of his guilty plea, Wilkerson wrote to the Superior Court requesting that he be permitted to withdraw the plea. Wilkerson contended that the sentencing order violated his plea agreement because it did not state that he was to enter a program for sex offenders at an out-of-state facility. The Superior Court denied Wilkerson's request to withdraw his guilty plea. The Superior Court also noted that it did not have authority to order Wilkerson's placement in a facility outside the State of Delaware and advised him to contact the Department of Corrections concerning a possible transfer. On September 23, 1996, at the request of Wilkerson's defense counsel, the Superior Court amended its sentencing order to include language recommending that Wilkerson be considered for placement in an out-of-state facility where he would have access to help for sex offenders. Wilkerson appealed from the Superior Court's amended sentencing order and this Court affirmed. Wilkerson's subsequent motion for postconviction relief, which, like his direct appeal, was based on the alleged violation of the terms of the plea agreement, was denied by the Superior Court. The denial of the motion was affirmed by this Court on appeal.

Wilkerson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 436, 1996, Walsh, J., 1997 WL 328625 (June 4, 1997) (ORDER).

Wilkerson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 418, 1998, Walsh, J., 1999 WL 504338 (Mar. 29, 1999) (ORDER).

(5) Rule 35(a) permits the Superior Court to correct an illegal sentence "at any time." "The `narrow function of Rule 35 is to permit correction of an illegal sentence, not to re-examine errors occurring at the trial or other proceedings prior to the imposition of sentence.'" "Relief under Rule 35(a) is available `when the sentence imposed exceeds the statutorily-imposed limits, [or] violates the Double Jeopardy Clause . . . "A sentence is also illegal if it `is ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment of conviction did not authorize.'"

Brittingham v. State, Del. Supr., 705 A.2d 577, 578 (1998) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 430 (1962)).

Id. (quoting United States v. Pavlico, 961 F.2d 440, 443 (4th Cir., 1992)).

Id. (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515 (10th Cir., 1997)).

(6) Wilkerson does not contend that his sentence was outside of the statutory authorization, constituted double jeopardy, or was ambiguous or contradictory. The only contentions in his Rule 35(a) motion involve the failure to transfer him to an out-of-state facility for treatment, which, he alleges, violates the terms of his plea agreement. Because that claim would require an examination of the proceedings leading up to the imposition of sentence, no relief is available to Wilkerson under Rule 35(a).

Id. (citing Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. at 430).

(7) Moreover, Wilkerson is barred from relitigating issues that were previously decided by the Superior Court and affirmed by this Court by subsequently raising the same claim in a Rule 35 motion for postconviction relief. This Court's prior decision on any adjudicated issue involving Wilkerson's claims became the law of the case in all subsequent stages of his continuing criminal proceedings. Both Wilkerson's direct appeal and his motion for postconviction relief were based on his claim that the sentencing order violated his plea agreement. Wilkerson may not use this Rule 35(a) motion to relitigate that claim.

Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d at 579.

Id.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.

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WILKERSON v. STATE
(Dec 2, 1999)