DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, and a new trial on the issues of liability and damages is granted, with costs to abide the event.
On the morning of January 29, 1990, the plaintiff was injured when she tripped and fell on the sidewalk near the corner of Court and Montague Streets in Brooklyn. The plaintiff subsequently commenced this action against the City, claiming that her accident had been caused by a hole in the curb at the edge of the sidewalk. At the conclusion of the liability phase of a bifurcated trial, the jury found the defendant 100% at fault for the plaintiff's injuries.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the liability verdict must be reversed because the trial court denied its request to charge the jury that it could be found liable only if it had prior written notice of the sidewalk defect which allegedly caused the plaintiff's fall. We agree. Administrative Code of City of New York § 7-201(c) limits the City's duty of care over municipal streets and sidewalks. Liability is imposed only for those defects or hazardous conditions for which the City has actually been notified exist at a specified location (see, Katz v. City of New York, 87 N.Y.2d 241, 243 ). Thus, prior written notice of a defect is a condition precedent which the plaintiff must plead and prove to maintain an action against the City (see, Katz v. City of New York, supra; Poirier v. City of Schenectady, 85 N.Y.2d 310, 313 ). To demonstrate compliance with the prior written notice provision, the plaintiff submitted evidence that a map prepared by the Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Corp., Inc., and served upon the Department of Transportation, indicated the existence of a broken curb on the northwest corner of Court and Montague Streets. Although such maps may serve as prior written notice of a defective condition (see, Katz v. City of New York, supra), there is a factual dispute regarding the precise location of the defect which allegedly caused the plaintiff's fall, and whether the alleged defect was the broken curb designated by the map. Under these circumstances, the trial court should have granted the defendant's request to charge that it could not be held liable unless the jury found that it had received prior written notice of the particular defect which caused the plaintiff's accident.
The error was compounded by the fact that the trial court gave a constructive notice charge that the defendant could be found negligent if, in the use of reasonable care, it should have known of the alleged sidewalk defect "in time to have corrected it or taken other suitable precautions". In the recent case of Amabile v. City of Buffalo ( 93 N.Y.2d 471 ), the Court of Appeals clarified that constructive notice of a sidewalk defect does not satisfy the statutory requirement that written notice be given to a municipality. Accordingly, the jury should not have been instructed that the City could be found negligent if it had constructive notice of the defect.
Since a new liability trial is required, we also note that the trial court should have sustained the defendant's objection to the plaintiff' s testimony that the defect which caused her accident was subsequently repaired. Evidence that repairs were made or remedial measures taken after an accident are not admissible to show that a party was negligent unless there is a disputed issue of maintenance or control (see, Watson v. FHE Serv., 257 A.D.2d 618 ;Cleland v. 60-02 Woodside Corp., 221 A.D.2d 307 ). As there was no disputed issue concerning the maintenance and control of the sidewalk where the accident occurred, the plaintiff's testimony regarding subsequent repairs should have been stricken. In addition, the trial court should have excluded evidence that permits were issued to contractors for certain construction work, including repaving, in the vicinity of the accident site. There is no indication that the work authorized by those permits was connected to the sidewalk defect which caused the plaintiff's fall, and the admission of such irrelevant evidence could serve only to confuse the jury (see, Matter of Klein, 262 A.D.2d 878; [3d Dept., June 24, 1999]).
The damages awarded by the jury for past and future pain and suffering deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation for the plaintiff's injuries (see generally, Dooknah v. Thompson, 249 A.D.2d 260 ; Zavurov v. City of New York, 241 A.D.2d 491 ; Lemberger v. City of New York, 211 A.D.2d 622 ; Burton v. New York City Hous. Auth., 191 A.D.2d 669 ). Accordingly, we have granted a new trial on the issue of damages as well as liability.
In light of our determination, it is unnecessary to reach the defendant's remaining contentions.
THOMPSON, J.P., JOY, KRAUSMAN, and GOLDSTEIN, JJ., concur.