DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the finding of the hearing court that there was probable cause for his arrest was supported by the record (see, People v. Brenfield, 188 A.D.2d 477, 478-479 ; People v. Sargeant, 174 A.D.2d 767 ; People v. James, 146 A.D.2d 712 ). The defendant improperly relies upon portions of the trial testimony in support of his contention that his mother did not have the requisite degree of control over his bedroom area to validly consent to the police entering his bedroom, where incriminating physical evidence was discovered. An appellate court is "precluded from reviewing trial testimony in determining whether the hearing court acted properly" (People v. Kendrick, 256 A.D.2d 420 ; see, People v. Kwang Young Choung, 229 A.D.2d 448 ). The propriety of the ruling to deny suppression must be determined only in light of the evidence that was before the hearing court (see, People v. Gonzalez, 55 N.Y.2d 720, 721-722 ; People v. Kendrick, supra). Since the defendant did not seek to reopen the hearing based upon the testimony adduced at trial, nor move for a mistrial, the issue is not properly before this court (see, People v. Kendrick, supra; People v. Gaston, 239 A.D.2d 356 ). In any event, the claim is without merit since the defendant's mother clearly possessed the requisite authority to permit a search of the bedroom located within her apartment (see, People v. Kelley, 220 A.D.2d 456 ; People v. Santornino, 153 A.D.2d 595 ).
The hearing record demonstrates that the defendant knew and understood his rights, and that his will was not overcome at any time during questioning so as to render his statements involuntary (see, People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 41 ). Therefore, the hearing court did not err in declining to suppress the defendant's statements to law enforcement officials.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant' s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15[5]).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.
S. MILLER, J.P., SANTUCCI, LUCIANO, and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.