Memorandum:
Supreme Court erred in denying defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendants met their initial burden, and "plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether defendant[s], as plaintiff's landlord[s], had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous lead paint condition for a sufficient period of time to have remedied it" ( Arnold v. Advantage Fed. Credit Union [appeal No. 2] , 261 A.D.2d 939 [decided May 7, 1999]). We reject plaintiff's contention that actual or constructive notice of the dangerous lead condition may be imputed to defendants because defendants were aware of chipping and peeling paint; defendants are both real estate brokers and landlords of other properties; defendant Paramjeet K. Malik is a registered nurse; and, before purchasing the subject property, she received mortgage documents for another property that referred to Federal lead based paint regulations ( see, Smith v. Saget, 258 A.D.2d 641, 641-642; Leeper v. Brady Burgess Mgt. Corp., 254 A.D.2d 695; Andrade v. Wong, 251 A.D.2d 609, 609-610; Lanthier v. Feroleto, 237 A.D.2d 877, 877-878).