DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
It is well-settled that a rear-end collision with a stopped automobile establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to explain how the accident occurred (see, Mendiolaza v. Novinski, 268 A.D.2d 462 [decided herewith]; Leal v. Wolff, 224 A.D.2d 392 ; Gambino v. City of New York, 205 A.D.2d 583 ). The operator of the moving vehicle is required to rebut the inference of negligence created by an unexplained rear-end collision (see, Pfaffenbach v. White Plains Express Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 132, 135 ; Mendiolaza v. Novinski, supra; Leal v. Wolff, supra). If that operator cannot come forward with any evidence to rebut the inference of negligence, the plaintiff may be awarded judgment as a matter of law (see, Leal v. Wolff, supra).
The plaintiff's statement in her affidavit that her car was at a complete stop when it was struck in the rear by the defendant's vehicle made out a prima facie case that the defendant had been negligent. The defendant's MV-104 form, which alleges only that the plaintiff's car stopped suddenly, is insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see, Leal v. Wolff, supra; Silberman v. Surrey Cadillac Limousine Serv., 109 A.D.2d 833 ).
O'BRIEN, J.P., SULLIVAN, GOLDSTEIN, LUCIANO, and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.