The verdict was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence. We see no reason to disturb the jury's determinations concerning credibility.
Defendant's speedy trial motion was properly denied. The period following the denial of defendant's suppression motion was properly excluded as a reasonable time to prepare for trial (see,People v. Heine, 238 A.D.2d 212). We conclude that this was "a reasonable period of delay resulting from . . . pre-trial motions" within the meaning of CPL 30.30(4)(a). The delay caused by the officer's injury was properly excluded as "exceptional circumstances" (CPL 30.30[4][g]), since the People represented to the court that the officer had broken her ankle and could not walk, even with crutches (see, People v. Celestino, 201 A.D.2d 91, 95; see also, People v. Womack, 229 A.D.2d 304, affd 90 N.Y.2d 974). Such a representation by the People was sufficient to permit the court to find that the adjournment was warranted.
We perceive no abuse of sentencing discretion and conclude that the sentence was not based on any improper criteria.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.