ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.
This is the fourth appearance of this case before this Court. In the last appeal, we reversed the juvenile court's order finding that the children were deprived and remanded the case for transfer proceedings to Banks County. In the Interest of B. G., 238 Ga. App. 227, 229 ( 518 S.E.2d 451) (1999). In that case, we found venue was improper under OCGA § 15-11-15(a) because the petitions alleging deprivation were filed in Gwinnett County and the children lived in Banks County. Id.
See In the Interest of B. G., 225 Ga. App. 492 ( 484 S.E.2d 293) (1997); In the Interest of B. G., 231 Ga. App. 39 ( 497 S.E.2d 572) (1998); In the Interest of B. G., 238 Ga. App. 227 ( 518 S.E.2d 451) (1999).
While the appeal of the deprivation order was still pending, the Gwinnett County Juvenile Court held a hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights and later granted that petition.
As stated above, this Court has already determined that venue was improper in Gwinnett County and has remanded the case for transfer to Banks County. Therefore, that holding is the law of the case and venue was also improper in the termination proceeding in Gwinnett County. Moreover, the Department of Family Children Services agrees that the prior reversal rendered the termination proceeding a nullity. Accordingly, the juvenile court's order terminating the parent's rights must be reversed, and the case remanded for transfer proceedings to Banks County. In the Interest of B. G., 238 Ga. App. at 229.
OCGA § 9-11-60(h) provides that the law of the case rule is abolished, provided, however, that any ruling by the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding on all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Reece, 236 Ga. App. 669, 672 ( 513 S.E.2d 243) (1999).
Judgment reversed and remanded. Ruffin and Ellington, JJ., concur.
ANDREWS, Presiding Judge.
DECIDED FEBRUARY 3, 2000 — RECONSIDERATION DENIED MARCH 1, 2000