ROBERT HOLMES BELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Defendant, Meijer, Inc., filed a motion for Summary Judgment on December 23, 1999, addressing plaintiff's claims as set forth in the complaint filed March 3, 1999, signed by both Mr. Brown and his then counsel, Lance A. Fertig. It appears Mr. Fertig's license to practice has been suspended and he has withdrawn from this matter. This Court has urged Mr. Brown to retain new counsel but none has been forthcoming. On January 3, 2000, Mr. Brown was notified, again, of the pendency of this summary judgment motion and given 28 days to respond, pursuant to W.D. Mich. LCivR. 7.2(c). No response has been filed. Therefore a review of said motion will be undertaken.
Randall Brown was hired in July 1984 at Store 52 in Lansing, Michigan, as a "food clerk." During his employment he was represented by Local 951 of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC and covered by a collective bargaining agreement. This agreement purported, by contract, to permit the employer to set certain employment policies and practices which were placed in employee handbooks and on company bulletin boards. This agreement, then, governed the terms, conditions, and wages of employment for Mr. Brown and all those employed at Store 52 by Meijer, Inc.
It appears that Mr. Brown was dismissed from employment by Meijer on February 14, 1996, for theft and unauthorized consumption of Meijer food product. (It is the position of Meijer that this theft was recorded by videotape and an admission of wrongdoing was signed by the defendant.) Plaintiff's union grievance contesting his discharge resulted in a meeting on March 11, 1996, at which time the charges and the videotape were reviewed. Meijer upheld its prior discharge. No demand for arbitration was thereafter filed by the union or Mr. Brown nor was any other appeal undertaken pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.
A summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. F.R.Civ.P.56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must review the factual evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. National Enterprises v. Smith, 114 F.3d 561, 563 (6th Cir. 1997). Entry of summary judgment is appropriate "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
Plaintiff's complaint contains the first two counts of "wrongful discharge" and "breach of contract and implied covenant of good-faith." It is well-settled law that an individual may not maintain a cause of action related to an employment discharge separate from the collective bargaining agreement to which he was a party during his employment. These claims are governed, or preempted, by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 . See Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 801.
Plaintiff's complaint also involves the claims of "intentional inflection of emotional distress" and "hostile work environment." These claims were pled in "boilerplate" or conclusory fashion without specific factual predicates. They appear to be hinged or tied to the claims of wrongful discharge of employment. Hence, they too are governed by Section 301 of 29 U.S.C. § 185, that is, any proofs of these conclusory allegations would require an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, these four above cited claims, which are preempted by Section 301 of 29 U.S.C. § 185, et seq. are required to be brought within six months of the discontinuance of the union grievance proceedings. See Del Costello v. International Board of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983). Obviously the filing of this lawsuit on March 19, 1999, is far beyond the six month statute of limitation.
Plaintiff's Count III, labeled handicap discrimination, is hard to decipher. Plaintiff has described in conclusory fashion "his handicap" but no where is it described. Thereafter the anti-discrimination mantra of "age . . . race . . . color" is conclusively recited, again with no description whatever of "his handicap." While inartfulness is not uncommon in pleadings, this pleading is entirely deficient in even giving minimal notice to a defendant of that which it must be called upon to defend.
Assuming for the sake of analysis that Count III sets forth a state cause of action for handicap discrimination, it is time barred by the three years required to bring such a suit. See Summer v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 427 Mich. 505, 510 (1986). Plaintiff was discharged on February 14, 1996. This lawsuit was filed March 19, 1999, more than three years after the discharge.
Accordingly, Counts I, II, IV, and V of the Complaint being preempted by Section 301 of 29 U.S.C. § 185 et seq. and Count III being time barred by the running of the statute of limitation, summary judgment must be GRANTED and all claims in this lawsuit DISMISSED. An order consistent with this opinion will be issued.