DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.
The Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiff's first and second causes of action alleging defamation, which stemmed from an accurate publication of statements made in the course of and pertinent to a judicial proceeding. The allegedly defamatory remarks were "absolutely privileged" (Martirano v. Frost, 25 N.Y.2d 505 ;Civil Rights Law § 74; see also, Park Knoll Assoc. v. Schmidt, 59 N.Y.2d 205 ; Romeo v. Village of Fishkill, 248 A.D.2d 700 ). Moreover, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that the judicial proceeding was brought solely for the purpose of disseminating the alleged defamation (cf., Williams v. Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592 ; Hughes Training, Inc. v. Pegasus Real Time, 255 A.D.2d 729 ).
The Supreme Court also properly dismissed the cause of action predicated upon Judiciary Law § 487 since there is no evidence that the defendants engaged in a "`chronic extreme pattern of legal delinquency'" (Estate of Steinberg v. Harmon, 259 A.D.2d 318 ; see, Mackley v. Sullivan Liapakis, P.C., US Dist Ct, SD NY, May 7, 1999, Kram, J.; see also, Beshara v. Little, 215 A.D.2d 823 ).
The plaintiff's remaining contentions are without merit.