Substantial evidence supports the Division's findings that the petitioners sexually harassed and constructively discharged complainant from her employment (see, Executive Law § 298 Exec.; 300 Gramatan Ave. Assocs. v. State Div. of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.2d 176), and its award of back pay. Although a complainant ordinarily has a duty to exercise diligence to mitigate his or her damages by making reasonable efforts to obtain comparable employment (Matter of State Div. of Human Rights v. N. Queensview Homes, 75 A.D.2d 819), the Commissioner properly determined that complainant was unable to work for a period after her constructive termination because of petitioners' actions (see, Matter of Grand Union Co. v. Mercado, 263 A.D.2d 923, 694 N.Y.S.2d 524). In addition, tips the complainant would have received in her employment as a waitress were properly included in the award (see, Matter of Hsu v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 241 A.D.2d 913).
However, the award of $500,000 in compensatory damages was excessive and we reduce said award to $125,000 (see, Anderson v. YARP Restaurant, Inc., ___ F. Supp. ___, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 560;cf., Matter of Town of Hempstead v. State Div. of Human Rights, 233 A.D.2d 451, appeal dismissed 89 N.Y.2d 1029, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 807).
The Division properly amended the complaint to add petitioner Romero as an individual respondent since the amendment related back to the original complaint and did not prejudice him, the initial filing against his restaurant having placed him on notice that his personal conduct toward complainant was the underlying issue in the case (see, Matter of Town of Lumberland v. New York State Div. of Human Rights 229 A.D.2d 631).
We have considered petitioners' remaining contentions and find them to be unavailing.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.