Plaintiff's claims of fraud, overreaching and duress have been previously dismissed, leaving the parties' mutual abandonment of the agreement's child support and custody provisions as the sole ground upon which rescission was premised and ultimately granted. This being the case, plaintiff's attempt to revisit the marital property settlement, 10 years after the fact, was properly rejected on the merits as inequitable (see, Reichard v. Reichard, 138 Misc.2d 1013). An award to plaintiff of counsel fees for work already performed was properly limited to fees attributable to those portions of the proceedings seeking ancillary matrimonial relief (see, Domestic Relations Law § 237[b]; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 116 A.D.2d 504; Donnarumma v. Donnarumma, 72 A.D.2d 545;Moat v. Moat, 27 A.D.2d 895, 897). Plaintiff's application for prospective counsel fees, however, should have been granted in view of the respective financial condition of the parties and the additional discovery and support hearing directed by the trial court.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.