Defendant's suppression motion was properly denied. The hearing evidence established that the voluntariness of defendant's statements to the police was not affected by injuries defendant accidentally sustained during his arrest, and for which he had received medical treatment well before his interrogation (see,People v. Nieves, 205 A.D.2d 173, affd 88 N.Y.2d 618; see also, People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 39).
The court properly refused to declare a mistrial during jury deliberations where the jury had been deliberating for less than two days and repeatedly requested reinstruction on the elements of the crimes charged (see, People v. Samper, 239 A.D.2d 191, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 910) and where the court also gave appropriate instructions on the deliberative process. The court properly denied another mistrial motion that was based upon defendant's speculative claim that a juror's desire to fax a lengthy note to her employer displayed a lack of focus on deliberations. Defendant's present claim that the court should have conducted an inquiry regarding the juror's ability to serve is unpreserved (see, People v. Sanabria, 266 A.D.2d 41, 42, 698 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623) and we decline to review it in the interest of justice. The court's decision to try to take a partial verdict instead of granting defendant's further mistrial motion was a proper exercise of discretion and was not coercive.
The court's denial, without a hearing, of defendant's motion to set aside the verdict alleging juror misconduct was proper. The post-trial statements by a juror complaining of "coercion" by other jurors were not a proper basis for impeaching the verdict (People v. Redd, 164 A.D.2d 34), especially in light of her confirmation that it was her verdict upon polling of the jury.
We perceive no abuse of discretion in sentencing.
We have considered and rejected defendant's remaining claims.
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.