Defendant `s suppression motion was properly denied. Given the interest of securing a prompt and reliable identification, the showup conducted approximately one and one-half hours after the incident at the hospital where defendant was being treated for his injuries was appropriate (see, People v. Santiago, 251 A.D.2d 239, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 985; People v. Conyers, 176 A.D.2d 340, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 825; People v. Thompson, 129 A.D.2d 655, 656-657).
The court properly exercised its discretion in permitting the complainant to be recalled to make an in-court identification of defendant (see, People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 667-668). In any event, any error in this regard would be harmless, because defendant expressly conceded the element of identity in his opening statement at trial.
The court properly admitted, with limiting instructions, testimony by the People's psychiatric expert witness that defendant admitted to him that he was driving a "hot" car on the night he set the fire. Although it reflected an uncharged crime, this statement was one of the facts upon which the psychiatrist based his opinion that defendant comprehended the wrongfulness of his actions on the night in question (see, People v. Santarelli, 49 N.Y.2d 241, 248-249;People v. Ryklin, 150 A.D.2d 509, 511, lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 746).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.