Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record establishes that defendant police officer was acting purely out of personal motives, and not within the scope of his employment or in furtherance of the City `s interests. The officer entered a restaurant while off duty and in civilian clothes, and, with his off-duty revolver in his hand, approached to within four or five feet of plaintiff, yelled and cursed at him, shot him once in the head, and then threw at him a summons and temporary order of protection issued on behalf of a woman who was the officer's ex-wife and plaintiff's girlfriend (see, Davis v. City of New York, 226 A.D.2d 271, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 815; Pekarsky v. City of New York, 240 A.D.2d 645, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 806; Lucey v. State of New York, 73 A.D.2d 998). Accordingly, the City cannot be held liable, under a theory of respondeat superior, for those actions, notwithstanding that plaintiff knew his assailant was a police officer, and that the officer told plaintiff he was under arrest after he shot him, although no arrest was actually made.
Leave to amend the complaint was also properly denied, as plaintiff `s factual allegations were insufficient to support his claim that the City was negligent in hiring, training, supervising or retaining defendant police officer (see, Rochlin v. Alamo, 209 A.D.2d 499, 500). As the officer was not acting within the scope of his employment or under the City's control, any alleged deficiency in its hiring or training procedures could not have proximately caused plaintiff's injuries (Koran I. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 256 A.D.2d 189, 192; McDonald v. Cook, 252 A.D.2d 302, 305, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 812).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.