DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that on the court's own motion the notice of appeal from so much of the order dated February 3, 1999, as, sua sponte, imposed a sanction on the appellant is treated as an application for leave to appeal from that portion of the order and leave to appeal is granted (see, CPLR 5701[c]); and it is further,
ORDERED that the appeals from the order dated December 23, 1998, and so much of the order dated February 3, 1999, as denied reargument are dismissed, as no appeal lies from an order denying reargument; and it is further,
ORDERED that the order dated February 3, 1999, is reversed insofar as reviewed, on the law; and it is further,
ORDERED that the respondent is awarded one bill of costs.
Despite the plaintiff wife's denomination of her successive motions as motions to vacate prior orders of the Supreme Court, Richmond County, on the ground of fraud, the motions were, in actuality, for reargument. Therefore, the order denying those motions is not appealable (see, Mucciola v. City of New York, 177 A.D.2d 553).
A court may impose a sanction sua sponte, but the party to be sanctioned must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard (see, 22 NYCRR 130-1.1[d]). Here, the plaintiff was not afforded such an opportunity (see, Walker v. Weinstock, 213 A.D.2d 631).
ALTMAN, J.P., FRIEDMANN, KRAUSMAN, and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.