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IN THE MATTER OF JACQUELINE BAGNASCO, RESPONDENT, v. SUFFOLK COUNTY WATER AUTHORITY, APPELLANT.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, as a matter of discretion, with costs, upon reargument, the order dated August 26, 1998, is vacated, the application is denied, the petition is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed.

Contrary to the appellant's contention, the petitioner's application was not time-barred under General Municipal Law § 50-i, the applicable Statute of Limitations ( see, Matter of Daniel J. v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 77 N.Y.2d 630; Cohen v. Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 256; Perry v. City of New York, 238 A.D.2d 326; General Municipal Law § 50-e; CPLR 208).

The Supreme Court, however, improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the application for leave to serve a late notice of claim. Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5), the Supreme Court, in determining whether to permit service of a late notice, must consider whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the petitioner was an infant or mentally or physically incapacitated, (3) the petitioner had a reasonable excuse for the delay in filing a notice of claim, and (4) the public corporation was prejudiced by the delay ( see, Cohen v. Pearl Riv. Union Free School Dist., 51 N.Y.2d 256, supra; Matter of Duarte v. Suffolk County, 230 A.D.2d 851; Matter of Morehead v. Westchester County, 222 A.D.2d 507).

The petitioner failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay of over three years from the time of the accident until she moved for leave to serve a late notice of claim, and similarly failed to show that there was any nexus between the delay and her infancy ( see, Matter of Cuffee v. City of New York, 255 A.D.2d 440; Matter of Salter v. Housing Auth., 251 A.D.2d 585; Matter of Winston v. City of New York, 249 A.D.2d 404; Matter of Altavilla v. Patchogue Medford School Dist., 221 A.D.2d 434). Moreover, the appellant did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts of the claim within 90 days or a reasonable time thereafter, and would be prejudiced if leave to serve a late notice were granted at this late date ( see, Matter of Turner v. New York City Hous. Auth., 243 A.D.2d 636; Matter of Scala v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 233 A.D.2d 514; Matter of Bordan v. Mamaroneck School Dist., 230 A.D.2d 792).

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IN RE BAGNASCO v. SUFFOLK CTY. WATER AUTH
(May 30, 2000)